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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we study a supplier’s operational decisions for supply chain
optimization considering corporate social responsibility implementation and livestreaming channel introduction. Both essays start from analytical models that are
inspired by observations, and we explore how different parameters affect the
supplier's decisions through extensive numerical studies. In the first essay, we notice
that cost auditing is becoming an increasingly important tool to improve supply
chain efficiency and mitigate the influence of information asymmetry. We study how
cost auditing indirectly influences retailer and supplier's behavior in social
responsibility. We also discuss the potential negative social responsibility
externalities of conducting an audit and the managerial insights. Finally, we find that
customers' attitude towards different products changes retailer and supplier's social
responsibility preference. In the second essay, we are interested in a new trend where
suppliers today adopt live-streaming channels for online shopping. We analyze the
trade-off between potential market demand and channel competition by introducing
live-streaming channel and discuss the impact of live-streaming channel on supply
chain optimization. As a result, both essays shed light on how suppliers respond to
downstream companies’ operational decisions.
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Chapter1
Introduction

1.1.

Overview of Essay 1

Firms increasingly recognize the importance of their upstream suppliers’ social responsibility. However, they may fail to heed the unintended negative
consequences of their own common practices on the suppliers’ social responsibility decision. We consider a setting where both the customer demand
and the production cost depend on the supplier’s social responsibility level.
The supplier has private information about his unit production cost, and the
retailer uses an incentive contract, coupled with an audit, to induce truthful reporting of the supplier’s cost type. We focus on the impact of cost
auditing on the supplier’s social responsibility decision. We find that the
impact hinges on consumers’ response to social responsibility. When demand
takes the additive form as a result of the consumer response, the cost of
information asymmetry does not change the supplier’s social responsibility
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decision, whereas an audit intended to counteract the information asymmetry may cause the supplier to either increase, decrease, or maintain his social
responsibility, depending on model parameters. When demand takes the multiplicative form, we find that the information asymmetry causes the supplier
to deviate from his first-best solution, but the deviation is limited. The supplier always adjusts his social responsibility level in response to the audit.
In cases of upward adjustments, the magnitude is typically insignificant. In
cases of downward adjustments, however, the reduction is typically more noticeable. Our findings suggest that a downstream firm’s seemingly unrelated
common practices may often inadvertently undermine the supplier’s social
responsibility choice, which sheds light on the reluctance of many suppliers
to commit to social responsibility programs.

3

1.2.

Overview of Essay 2

Live-streaming shopping has become a significant and powerful sales force
nowadays. It allows viewers to watch and shop through real-time interactions
over the phone. More and more companies start to launch their live-streaming
shopping to consumers. We investigate how a supplier responds to the fastgrowing live-streaming commerce and if a supplier should collaborate with
key opinion leaders (KOLs). We first examine multiple centralized settings
when a supplier builds his own live-streaming teams and hosts live sessions.
Our analysis shows that the supplier faces a trade-o↵ between the potential
market demand increase and the channel competition. The supplier should
only use the traditional channel if the live-streaming channel cannot attract
many consumers. Otherwise, despite the channel competition, the supplier
should use a dual-channel supply chain or a single live-streaming channel for
profit maximization. Note that when the channel substitution is low, the
dual-channel supply chain can dominate the single-channel options. We also
design a two-stage game to formulate one decentralized case that the supplier
o↵ers a revenue-sharing contract and sells products through a KOL’s stream.
Our results show that the supplier and the KOL will be discouraged in media
investment compared with the centralized models, which might decrease the
supplier’s expected profit eventually.
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Chapter2
The Impact of Cost Auditing on Supply Chain
Social Responsibility

2.1.

Introduction

Corporate social responsibility (CSR), broadly speaking, is a self-regulating
business model that helps a company be socially accountable—to itself, its
stakeholders, and the public. By practicing corporate social responsibility,
companies can be conscious of the kind of impact they are having on all aspects of society, including economic, social, and environmental (Investopedia,
2021). CSR, along with a closely related concept ESG (environment, social,
governance), which sets measurable goals for CSR, has become an increasingly higher priority for companies, driven by pressure from key stakeholders
including consumers, regulators, and investors.
A growing body of academic research and consumer surveys have shown
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that CSR is now woven into the very fabric of how consumers lead their
lives. They reveal that global consumers view CSR as a personal responsibility to be integrated and championed. For instance, Lee and Shin (2010)
find a significant positive relationship between a company’s CSR activities
and consumers’ purchase intention scales. Huang et al. (2017) report that
CSR perceived by customers has a strong e↵ect on fostering long-term loyalty. A survey in 2019 shows that 47% of internet users had switched to a
di↵erent brand because the company violated their personal values (Insider
Intelligence, 2019).
In an attempt to promote ESG awareness and transparency, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued a flurry of notices
that ESG disclosures will be priorities in 2021 (The New York Times, 2021).
Investors are expecting companies to more clearly explain how they are addressing ESG matters, as they realize that companies with a convincing ESG
strategy can positively influence their future growth and reduce risks. According to a proxy season study in 2019, more than 50% of investors surveyed
consider ESG to be the top management priorities. 77% European institutions and 65% U.S. institutions claim that they have an explicit ESG policy
in their own organization (Ernst & Young LLP, 2020). Morningstar (2020)
reports that the U.S. sustainable funds available to investors reached 10.5
billion in the first quarter of 2020, which is around 1.5 billion more than the
record in the fourth quarter of 2019.
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It is well-known that a supplier’s social responsibility violation scandals
have a ripple e↵ect throughout the entire supply chain. For instance, a series
of suicides of Foxconn’s assembly line workers, due to immense stress, long
workdays, unfair fines, unkept promises of benefits, and harsh managers who
were prone to humiliate workers for mistakes, caused a media sensation –
suicides and sweatshop conditions in the House of iPhone, as the tragedies
took place at Foxconn’s enormous plant in Shenzhen, China, which is a major manufacturer of Apple products (The Wall Street Journal 2011; CNN
2012). As a result, various rights groups demonstrated outside Apple stores
in multiple cities around the world. Failure to correctly act on ESG policies
also caused a building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013 with more than a thousand deaths (The New York Times 2013; The Guardian 2013). The building
housed a number of separate garment factories that manufactured apparel for
brands including Walmart, Benetton, Prada, Gucci, Versace, and Mango. As
the public outcry grew, a group of seventeen major North American retailers,
including Walmart, Gap, Target, and Macy’s, announced a plan to improve
factory safety in Bangladesh later that year. McDonald’s was forced to cut
ties with one of its chicken suppliers in 2015 after gruesome video footage
made public appeared to show the supplier clubbing small and sickly birds to
death (USA Today, 2015). The company reported in 2020 to have made substantial e↵orts to achieve every one of its responsible sourcing goals related to
sustainably sourcing its priority commodities, including beef, chicken, co↵ee,
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palm oil, fish, and fiber-based guest packaging (McDonald’s, 2020).
All the aforementioned examples point to the critical influence of a supplier’s social responsibility level on downstream firms. Evidently, it is in the
downstream firms’ interest to provide incentives to bolster the supplier’s social responsibility. Less evident is the peril that certain operations of the
downstream firms, albeit well justified apparently, may inadvertently lead
their suppliers to a lower social responsibility level. Cost auditing we study
in this paper may be such a perilous practice that can cause unintended
negative consequences.
Accounting research has documented that cost is a function of factors such
as asset intensity, demand uncertainty, financial risk, supplier and labor relations (Hongren et al., 2012). A supplier’s production cost is usually guarded
as a top trade secret, as failure to protect cost information could expose
him to significant risks and jeopardize his bargaining power in negotiating
contracts with his business clients. In the presence of cost information asymmetry, the retailer can design an incentive contract to induce the supplier
to truthfully reveal his private cost information. This, however, requires the
retailer to pay a premium as the information rent to the supplier and distort
her decisions, thus causing the so-called agency loss.
A cost audit comes in handy in such a situation, as it can further deter
the supplier from misreporting his cost information and mitigate the agency
loss. Cost audits have been reported to be widely used in supply chain man-
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agement. Professional organizations such as the International Associations
of Commerce and Contract Management (Contract Standards, 2018) recommend that cost audits be included as part of the standard supply chain
contract clauses of “financial audit.” Such audit clauses state that a buyer
has the legal right to audit its suppliers’ cost if the cost a↵ects the execution
of the contract. In practice, many specialized third-party audit services, such
as Dryden Group (https://drydengroup.com/procurement-audit/), are readily available. Cost auditing is also common across the world. For instance,
Indian companies in certain industries, such as manufacturing, mining, and
services, are required to undergo a cost audit under the Companies Act, 2013.
The Institute of Cost Accountants of India provides detailed guidelines on
audit procedures of material, labor, and other costs.
To better understand the implications of cost auditing, we consider a twotier supply chain consisting of a supplier (him) and a retailer (her). In the
presence of private production cost information possessed by the supplier,
the retailer designs an incentive contract with a potential cost audit. We
concentrate on two major research questions: first, how does the retailer’s
audit mechanism a↵ect the supplier’s social responsibility decision? Second,
to what extent does the impact of the audit mechanism hinge on market parameters and consumers’ response to social responsibility? To answer these
questions, we formulate a two-stage problem where the supplier chooses his
social responsibility level in the first stage, in anticipation of the retailer’s
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rational response. In the second stage, we adopt the principal-agent framework to model the optimal audit mechanism designed by the retailer (the
principal), given the supplier’s social responsibility decision in the first stage.
Needless to say, a high social responsibility boosts customer demand. But
di↵erent consumer responses to the social responsibility could result in demand being amplified in di↵erent ways – termed additive and multiplicative
demand models in our paper. It turns out that the di↵erent consumer responses play a pivotal role and the two corresponding demand models lead
to distinct findings. In the additive demand model, we find that while the
information asymmetry does not alter the supplier’s social responsibility decision, an audit, which is meant to counteract the information asymmetry, may
cause the supplier to increase, decrease, or maintain his decision, depending
on parametric conditions. In the multiplicative model, the information asymmetry always causes the supplier’s social responsibility level to deviate from
its first-best solution, but the deviation is limited. The threat of an audit
prompts the supplier to adjust his social responsibility level. In cases where
the social responsibility level is decreased, the reduction is typically significant. Our results suggest that, from a managerial point of view, downstream
firms should be mindful of noticeable unintended negative consequences of
cost auditing. In addition, it is crucial for them to have a thorough understanding of the market parameters and the way consumers react to the supply
chain’s social responsibility level when considering a cost audit.
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To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to examine the potential negative impact of a downstream firm’s common practice on the upstream
supplier’s social responsibility decision. Our findings caution practitioners to
take a more complete view of their operations in order to avoid undermining
the supply chain’s social responsibility. Evidence in recent years suggests
that despite the critical importance of CSR, many firms still lack commitment to CSR programs. Institutional Investor (2019), for instance, finds that
many of the companies identified on Fortune magazine’s annual Change the
World list do not achieve the top ESG rankings in their industries, nor do
they have any significant presence of socially responsibly investment (SRI)
funds in their share registry. An Alfac survey also brings to light that 57%
executives find it difficult to get their CSR programs funded, and investors
estimate that, on average, only 45% of the companies they have invested
in are socially responsible (Aflac, 2016). Moussu and Ohana (2016) provide
a financial leverage interpretation of the underinvestment in CSR. Our paper o↵ers a di↵erent angle through the lens of supply chain management to
understand companies’ insufficient commitment.

2.2.

Literature Review

There has been increasing research interest in socially and environmentally
responsible supply chain management in recent years (Deshpande and Swami-
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nathan 2020; Feng et al. 2017), and the scale and scope of research are expected to keep growing in the near future (Atasu et al., 2020). Lee and Tang
(2018) and Lee (2021) discuss new research opportunities in this area and describe sample research works based on real-life practices. We briefly review
papers closely related to our work in this rapidly expanding research area.
Many researchers have studied various ways to induce, improve, or implement socially and environmentally responsible supply chains. Porteous
et al. (2015) use empirical data to test the relationship between the buyer’s
supplier incentives and penalties for the supplier’s social and environmental
compliance, and the outcomes in terms of reduction in supplier social and environmental violations as well as the buyer’s own operating costs. Letizia and
Hendrikse (2016) study the impact of supply chain structures on the adoption of CSR activities. They show that incentives for CSR investments can
be provided through the supply chain structure and that the structure that
best incentivizes CSR investments depends on the interaction between CSR
vertical synergy, free-riding, and countervailing power. In a similar spirit,
Orsdemir et al. (2019) study vertical integration as a mechanism to address
corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER). They also investigate conditions under which CSER concerns will drive vertical integration.
Wang et al. (2017) and Chuang et al. (2014) study the relationship between
channel dynamics and sustainability. Guo et al. (2016) analyze the sourcing decision of a buyer choosing between responsible suppliers who adhere
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to strict social and environmental responsibility standards and risky suppliers who may experience responsibility violations. They show that e↵orts to
improve supply chain responsibility that focus on consumers or increasing
supply chain transparency may lead to unintended consequences, such as an
increase in risky sourcing. Agrawal and Lee (2019) examine how a buyer
can use sourcing policies to influence their suppliers to adopt sustainable
processes. Feng et al. (2021) apply a bargaining framework to study the implementation of environmental and social responsibility programs in a general
supply network.
Several papers study the role of information disclosure in addressing CSR.
Cho et al. (2019) consider a setting where a manufacturer may or may not
disclose to the public its amount of e↵ort to inspect the supplier’s employment
of child labor. They find that information disclosure can reduce the use of
child labor under certain conditions. Kalkanci and Plambeck (2020a) explore
conditions under which a buying firm can increase supplier responsibility
by committing to publish a list of its suppliers and/or the identities and
violations of terminated suppliers. Kalkanci and Plambeck (2020b) consider
the scenario where a buying firm might in the future incur costs associated
with a supplier’s social or environmental impacts. They investigate whether
the buying firm should learn about the supplier’s impacts, how much cost to
incur to reduce the supplier’s impacts, and whether to disclose the supplier’s
impacts to investors. They find that mandatory disclosure deters learning and
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thus, under plausible conditions, results in higher expected supplier impacts.
The majority of the responsible supply chain literature focuses on auditing
as a mechanism to motivate supplier CSR or mitigate supplier responsibility
risk. Plambeck and Taylor (2016) study a range of ways (increasing auditing,
publicizing negative audit reports, providing loans to suppliers) to induce
higher supplier social and environmental responsibility, and characterize a
backfiring condition under which the supplier will evade audits and exert less
e↵ort to prevent harm. Chen and Lee (2017) compare common supplier responsibility risk mitigation instruments, including supplier certification, process audits, and contingency payments, and evaluate their e↵ectiveness. They
find that these instruments are all complementary to each other and that
when used jointly, they deliver better supplier risk mitigation results. Caro
et al. (2018) assess the benefits of joint audits (buyers conduct audits jointly)
and shared audits (easy buyer conducts audits independently but share audit
reports with each other), and find that they outperform independent audits.
Chen et al. (2020a) consider a supply network with multiple buyers and suppliers, and analyze the impact of supplier centrality on the firms’ auditing
priority. Chen et al. (2020b) study the e↵ect of supplier-auditor collusion on
the buyer’s auditing and contracting strategy and develop collusion-reduction
measures. In a recent paper, Zhang et al. (2021) study how to best conduct
audits in supply chain networks with multiple tiers of suppliers.
All the above-mentioned papers examine incentives and mechanisms di-
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rectly designed to address CSR. Our model di↵ers in that cost auditing, which
is a common practice to mitigate the downstream firm’s asymmetric cost information disadvantage, is not directly related to supplier CSR but could
seriously undermine the supplier’s CSR commitment.
Our work is reminiscent of the literature on quality management in the
sense that quality and social responsibility shape customer demand and production cost in a similar fashion (Kaya and Özer 2009; Banker et al. 1998).
However, a key di↵erence sets them apart: the social responsibility decision
in our model is interlaced with the risk of supplier responsibility violations,
which are usually much publicized through various channels (e.g., media,
third party organizations) and receive a lot of attention, but supplier quality problems (in parts they supply) often do not manifest themselves until
quality failure of the downstream buyer’s final product.

2.3.

Model Framework

2.3.1

Sequence of Events

Consider a two-tier supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The
supplier’s unit product cost could be either low (cl ) with probability wl or
high (ch ) with probability wh , where cl < ch , and wl + wh = 1. To investigate
the supplier’s social responsibility level decision in anticipation of a possible
audit by the retailer, we formulate a two-stage problem. The sequence of
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events, shown in Figure 2.1, is as follows:
Figure 2.1: Timeline of Events

Complete information:
Cost type is revealed to retailer

0

1

Cost type is unknown
to both parties

Supplier picks the level
of social responsibility

Stage 1

2
Cost type is
revealed to supplier

3
Retailer designs a
menu of contracts

4
Supplier chooses a
contract from the menu

5
Retailer audits
the supplier

Time

Stage 2

Stage 1: At the beginning of the game (time 0), neither the supplier nor
the retailer knows the cost type. At time 1, the supplier determines his level
of social responsibility, ✓, before knowing his cost type. It is worth mentioning that following prior literature (Caro et al. 2018; Kalkanci and Plambeck
2020a; Lu and Tomlin 2021), we use a single variable ✓ 2 [0, 1] to denote the
supplier’s social responsibility level, which can be thought of as an aggregate
measure of the supplier’s degree of compliance to set industry standards. Such
a modeling feature is supported by real life practices. Starbucks, for instance,
has developed its Co↵ee and Farm Equity (C.A.F.E) program, which sets a
series of ethical sourcing standards by using a published scoreboard. There
are as many as 185 indicators to evaluate a supplier’s behavior in economic
transparency, social responsibility, environment leadership and quality. Only
suppliers with an aggregate score of 80% or more would be awarded “strategic supplier” status (Daily Co↵ee News 2015; Starbucks Corporation 2020).
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Similarly, IKEA has developed its own code of conduct, called IWAY, to
evaluate its suppliers for responsibly procuring products, services, materials,
and components (IKEA, 2019).
Stage 2: At time 2, the supplier learns his own cost type, which is still
unknown to the retailer. At time 3, the retailer designs an audit mechanism,
that is, a menu of contracts {pi , ti , xi }, i 2 {l, h}, which consists of three
elements: the unit retail price pi , the transfer payment to the supplier ti for
goods acquired, and the audit probability xi . At time 4, the supplier reports
his cost type by choosing a contract from the menu, and finally, at time 5, the
retailer audits the supplier’s cost according to the audit mechanism designed
at time 3 and charges the supplier a penalty oi if the supplier misreports his
cost type at time 4.

2.3.2

Model Setup

To ensure tractability and focus on the main research questions, we adopt
a parsimonious demand model. The base demand is the classic downward
sloping demand function a bpi , which is then augmented by supplier’s social
responsibility level. Conceivably, customers are more willing to purchase the
product if it is sourced from a more socially responsible supplier. We consider
two possible cases where customers are influenced by the supplier’s social
responsibility level ✓. In the first case, termed additive case, an increase in ✓
attracts more customers to purchase the product, which e↵ectively expands
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the market base from a to a + g(✓). Therefore, the demand function is given
as follows:
qi (✓) = a + g(✓)

bpi , i 2 {l, h}.

(2.1)

It is worth noting that g(✓) is assumed to be concave increasing, which
reflects the fact that the pace of demand gain as a result of improved ✓ is
typically decelerating.
In the second case, an increase in g(✓) prompts all existing customers
who are willing to buy the product at the current price to increase their
consumption. This is modelled as the multiplicative case as follows:
qi (✓) = (a

bpi )g(✓), i 2 {l, h}.

(2.2)

The supplier’s unit production cost consists of two parts. The first part
is the base cost ci , which has two types (low or high, i.e., i 2 {l, h}), as
explained earlier. The second part is r(✓), which captures the additional unit
cost incurred corresponding to the social responsibility e↵orts. Note that r(✓)
is assumed to be convex increasing, as it usually demands progressively more
investments to improve the social responsibility level ✓. Combined together,
the supplier’s unit production cost is cl +r(✓) with probability wl , and ch +r(✓)
with probability wh .
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2.4.

Additive Demand Model

This section examines the additive demand model captured in Equation (2.1).
To solve the two-stage problem, we employ the standard backward induction
approach. That is, we begin with stage 2 to determine the retailer’s optimal
audit mechanism for a given supplier social responsibility level ✓, then we go
back to stage 1 to determine the supplier’s optimal ✓.
In stage 2, given the supplier’s choice of ✓, the retailer designs a menu of
contracts {pi , ti , xi } to maximize her expected profit ⇧r as follows.
max ⇧r =

{pi ,ti ,xi }

X

wi [pi qi

i=l,h

ti

Kx2i ], i 2 {l, h}.

(2.3)

In the above formulation, for each cost type, pi qi is the retailer’s revenue,
ti is her payment to the supplier for the acquisition of qi units of the products,
and Kx2i is her cost to conduct an audit. Expectation is then taken over the
two possible cost types.
In stage 1, in anticipation of the retailer’s rational response, the supplier
determines his optimal level of social responsibility ✓, before his production
cost type is revealed by nature, to maximize his expected profit ⇧s as follows.
max ⇧s =
✓

X

i=l,h

wi [ti

(ci + r(✓))qi ], i 2 {l, h},

(2.4)

where ti is the transfer payment received from the retailer, and (ci + r(✓))qi
is the total cost of producing qi units of the product. Again, expectation
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is taken over the two possible cost types, as the supplier has to make the ✓
decision before learning his true cost type.

2.4.1

First-Best Case: Complete Information

We first analyze the first-best case to establish a benchmark. In this case,
the retailer has complete information about the supplier’s cost type before
designing the optimal audit mechanism, as illustrated by the dashed arrow in
the timeline (see Figure 2.1). Given the knowledge of the true cost type, the
retailer will clearly extract all surplus from the supplier, leaving him nothing.
In other words, the retailer will set the transfer payment to ti = (ci + r(✓))qi
to just cover the supplier’s production cost. In addition, audit is unnecessary,
so the retailer’s optimal audit probability xl = xh = 0. For the same reason,
the cost of audit Kx2i plays no role in this first-best case. As a result, the
retailer’s problem in stage 2 reduces from Equation (2.3) to the following:
max ⇧r =

{pi ,ti }

X

wi [pi

ci

r(✓)][a

bpi + g(✓)].

(2.5)

i=l,h

The optimal solutions are summarized in the following lemma. All proofs
are collected in Appendix B.
Lemma 2.1. In the first-best case, the retailer’s optimal menu of contracts is
as follows: for i 2 {l, h}, the optimal price is pFi =

1
2b [a + g(✓) + b(ci + r(✓))],

the optimal transfer payment is tFi = [ci + r(✓)]qiF , and the corresponding

demand is

qiF

=

1
2 [a + g(✓)
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b(ci + r(✓))], where the superscript F denotes the

optimal solution in the first-best case.
Substituting the optimal decisions into Equation (2.5) yields the following
optimal expected profit for the retailer, which is also the optimal expected
profit for the entire supply chain:
⇧Fr =

X 1
wi [a + g(✓)
4b

b(ci + r(✓))]2

(2.6)

i=l,h

As noted above, in the first-best case, the retailer will design the menu of
contracts in such a way that the supplier makes no profit. As a result, the
supplier’s optimization problem in Equation (2.4) is trivial – the supplier is
totally indi↵erent to ✓. For the convenience of exposition, let us select the
supply chain profit maximizing ✓ as the optimal choice in the first-best case.
This result is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. In the first-best case, the supplier’s expected profit is always
0. The optimal social responsibility level, denoted by ✓F , can be characterized
by
br0 (✓F ) = g 0 (✓F ).

(2.7)

From a marginal analysis point of view, the right-hand side of the above
equation g 0 (✓F ) is the marginal benefit of increasing ✓, as demand increases
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at the rate g (✓ ). The left-hand side is the marginal cost, which is rate of
0

F

the unit cost increase r0 (✓F ) times the slope of the demand b. The optimal ✓
is set in such a way that these two sides are balanced. It is worth noting that
there is at most one solution to the above equation, because by assumption,
the convexity of r(✓) implies br0 (✓F ) is strictly increasing and the concavity of
g(✓) implies g 0 (✓F ) is strictly decreasing. As a result, the two curves can meet
at most once. To avoid the trivial case of non-existence of any solution, we
assume the following regularity condition: a + g(✓F ) bpFi > 0, which ensures
a positive demand at ✓F , as can be seen from Equation (2.1). Further, we
assume the parametric conditions are such that ✓F < 1 to avoid the trivial
case of boundary solutions.

2.4.2

Second-Best Case: Asymmetric Information without an Audit

We now turn our attention to the second-best case where there is asymmetric
information about the supplier’s unit production cost ci for i 2 {l, h}. More
specifically, this cost is the supplier’s private information not known to the
retailer. This subsection examines the no-audit case, i.e., in stage 2 of the
problem, the retailer’s audit probability xi is set to 0, and his decisions reduce
to the price pi and the transfer payment ti .
As is standard in the mechanism design literature (Fudenberg and Tirole,
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1991, Chapter 7), we invoke the revelation principle, which says that truthtelling direct revelation mechanisms can generally be used to achieve the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of other mechanisms. In other words,
we can restrict our attention to incentive compatible contracts where it is
optimal for the supplier to reveal his true cost type.
The complete mechanism design problem for the retailer in stage 2 is as
follows:
max ⇧r =

{pi ,ti }

s.t.
(IRl ) tl
(IRh ) th
(ICl ) tl
(ICh ) th

X

wi (pi qi

ti )

i=l,h

(cl + r(✓))ql

0,

(ch + r(✓))qh
(cl + r(✓))ql
(ch + r(✓))qh

0,
th
tl

(cl + r(✓))qh ,
(ch + r(✓))ql .

In the above formulation, the objective function follows directly from
Equation (2.3). The first two constraints are the so-called individual rationality (IR) constraints, which guarantee that the supplier’s profit is nonnegative
by truthfully reporting his cost type. The two incentive compatibility (IC)
constraints ensure that he is (weakly) better o↵ reporting his true cost type.
To facilitate further discussion, let us define the di↵erence between the
two cost types as

= ch cl . In addition, we introduce the concept of virtual

cost below for convenience of notation.

Definition 1. The virtual cost for the high type (type h) is vn ⌘ ch +

wl
wh
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where the subscript n refers to the no-audit case.
Proposition 2.2. In the no-audit case, the retailer’s optimal menu of contracts is as follows:
2

3

2

3

2

N
6 pl 7

4

2

tN
l

1
6 2b [a

5=4

3

+ b(cl + r(✓)) + g(✓)]7
5,
N
N
(cl + r(✓))ql + qh
3

1
N
6ph 7 6 2b [a + b(vn + r(✓)) + g(✓)]7
4 5=4
5,
N
N
th
(ch + r(✓))qh

where a decision with the superscript N denotes its optimal solution in the
no-audit case, and qiN , the demand corresponding to the optimal price pN
i , can
be determined from Equation (2.1) as follows: qlN = 12 [a + g(✓)
and qhN = 12 [a + g(✓)

b(cl + r(✓))],

b(vn + r(✓))].

Proposition 2.2 is consistent with standard results in the mechanism deF
sign literature. For the low type (efficient) supplier, we have pN
l = pl , which

mirrors the “no distortion at the top” property (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991),
i.e., the first-best decision pFl is not distorted in the presence of information
asymmetry. However, the optimal transfer payment tN
l di↵ers from its counterpart tFl in the first-best case. This is because the retailer has to pay the
so-called information rent

qhN to the low type supplier to prevent him from

lying. For the high type supplier, the optimal price pN
h deviates from its counterpart pFh in the first-best case, but they are similar structurally in the sense
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that they take the same functional form, with the only di↵erence being that
the virtual cost vn is now in place of ch . The reason for this change is that
the retailer has to distort the price for the high type supplier to curtail the
information rent paid to the low type supplier. As for the transfer payment
tN
h , it is just enough to for the high type supplier to cover his total production
cost. This is because the high type supplier does not gain from pretending
to be the low type (the constraint ICh shows that given the optimal menu
of contracts, the high type supplier is worse-o↵ if he misreports). In other
words, the high type supplier does not have any incentive to lie. As a result,
the retailer can extract all his surplus.
Now we go back to stage 1 of the problem to solve for the supplier’s
optimal social responsibility level decision ✓. To that end, we substitute the
optimal results in Proposition 2.2 into the supplier’s expected profit function
in Equation (2.4), which becomes a function of the only unknown ✓:
max ⇧s =
✓

X

wi [ti

(ci + r(✓))qi ]

i=l,h

= w l qh =

1
wl
2

[a + g(✓)

b(vn + r(✓))] .

(2.8)

Proposition 2.3. In the no-audit case, the supplier’s optimal level of social
responsibility is characterized by
br0 (✓N ) = g 0 (✓N ).

(2.9)
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It is interesting to note that Equation (2.9) is identical to Equation (2.7),
that is, the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level decision is the same in
the first-best and no-audit cases. This suggests that information asymmetry
does not alter the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level. Technically,
this is because that the objectives functions in Equations (2.8) and (2.6) are
structurally very similar, leading to the same optimization results. Intuitively,
g(✓) only shifts the demand up or down, and the profit function inherits the
shifting e↵ect. The maximum profit may shift up or down, but the optimal
✓ stays the same.

2.4.3

Audit Case: Asymmetric Information with an
Audit

As discussed in the no-audit case, possessing private information about the
unit production cost ci allows the low type supplier to have a net surplus,
which is his information rent

qhN . Information asymmetry also forces the

retailer to distort the price for the high type supplier (pN
h ) from the first-best
solution, thus causing agency loss for the entire supply chain. One tool is to
address the adverse e↵ects of information asymmetry is audit. As we will see
shortly, threatening the supplier with a possible audit allows the retailer to
squeeze some information rent out of the supplier. It can also partially restore
the distortion in the price for the high type supplier pN
h , thus mitigating the
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agency loss.
This section investigates the audit case, where the retailer’s complete
menu of contracts is {pi , ti , xi }, and xi 2 [0, 1] is the probability for the retailer to audit the supplier. Such a modeling approach draws on the vast
economics literature, e.g., Mookherjee and Png (1989), Dunne and Loewenstein (1995), Khalil (1997), La↵ont and Martimort (2002). In the supply
chain management literature, Chen and Lee (2017) essentially employ the
same approach, although they interpret the audit probability as the audit
e↵ort level. Audits are costly and we assume the retailer incurs an audit cost
Kx2i , which is convex increasing in xi for K > 0.
The retailer levies a penalty on the supplier if he is caught lying about his
type in an audit. Let oi , i 2 {l, h}, denote type i supplier’s penalty for misreporting. For example, if the low type supplier reports high cost ch and the
lie is detected in an audit, then the low type supplier has to pay a penalty ol .
Following La↵ont and Martimort (2002), we adopt endogenous punishments
and assume that the penalty is capped at the supplier’s maximum gain from
a false announcement. For instance, if a low type supplier pretends to be the
high type, then his gain is th

(cl + r(✓))qh , which is the highest possible

penalty for ol . More formally, we have the following two constraints:
th
tl

(cl + r(✓))qh

ol ,

(2.10)

(ch + r(✓)ql

oh .

(2.11)
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Stage 2: Retailer’s Mechanism Design
In the audit case, the retailer’s mechanism design problem parallels the one
in the no-audit case. The complete formulation is as follows.
max ⇧r =

{pi ,ti ,xi }

tl

(IRh )

th

(ICl )

tl

(ICh )

th

w i p i qi

ti

Kx2i

(2.12)

i=l,h

s.t.
(IRl )

X

(cl + r(✓))ql

0,

(ch + r(✓))qh
(cl + r(✓))ql
(ch + r(✓))qh

0,
th
tl

(cl + r(✓))qh

xh o l ,

(ch + r(✓))ql .

It is worth noting that the misreport penalty oi does not enter the retailer’s
profit function, as the IC constraints ensure that the supplier will report his
type truthfully, and thus no penalty will be levied in any event. The IC
constraints also reveal potential benefits of an audit. Compared to their
counterparts in the no-audit case, the right-hand side of the IC constraints is
reduced by xi oj , where i 6= j, which e↵ectively expands the feasible region of
the optimal solutions, possibly leading to a higher objective function value.
The downside of an audit is of course the expected cost of the audit, which
is part of the profit function.
Before proceeding to the optimal solutions, we define the following virtual
cost for the high type supplier in the audit case for ease of notation, similar
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to the no-audit case.
Definition 2. The virtual cost for the high type supplier in the audit case is
va = ch +

wl
wh (1

xh ) .

As we can see, va basically extends its counterpart vn in the no-audit case
by incorporating the audit probability xh . Clearly, va  vn , and the equality
holds if and only if xh = 0.
Proposition 2.4. Assume 4Kwh2

b

2

wl2 > 0, then the retailer’s optimal

menu of contracts in the audit case is as follows:
2 3 2
3
a+g(✓)+b(c
+r(✓))
l
A
2b
6 pl 7 6
7
6 7 6
7
6 xA 7 = 6
7,
0
6 l7 6
7
4 5 4
5
A
A
A
tl
[cl + r(✓)]ql + (1 xh ) qh
2

3

A
6 ph 7

2

6
6 7 6
6 xA 7 = 6 w l w h
6 h 7 6 4Kwh2 b
4 5 4
tA
h

a+g(✓)+b(vaA +r(✓))
2b
2 w2
l

[a + g(✓)

3

7
7
b(vn + r(✓))]7
7,
5

[ch + r(✓)]qhA

where a decision with the superscript A denotes its optimal solution in the
audit case, vaA ⌘ ch + wwhl (1

A
xA
h ) , and qi , the demand corresponding to the

A
optimal price pA
i , can be determined from Equation (2.1) as follows: ql =
1
2 [a

b(cl + r(✓))], and qhA = 12 [a + g(✓)

+ g(✓)

b(vaA + r(✓))].

This proposition merits a couple of remarks. First, the technical condition
4Kwh2

b

2

wl2 > 0 is sufficient to guarantee that the optimal solution xh is

positive. Otherwise and audit case will simply reduce to the no-audit case.
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Coincidentally, it also ensures that the objective function is jointly concave
in the decision variables. Note that K is a parameter pertaining to the total
cost of all product units, while

is the price di↵erence of each product unit.

Therefore, they are typically two quantities of di↵erent magnitude, making
the condition 4Kwh2

b

2

wl2 > 0 easy to satisfy. In fact, this condition is

met in our extensive numerical experiments under all circumstances where
k is reasonable large. Second, a comparison between the audit and no-audit
cases reveals the role of the audit. For the low type supplier, the corresponding optimal price pA
l is still the first-best solution, and the optimal audit
probability xA
l = 0, because the high type supplier has no incentive to lie at
all (see proof of this proposition for more detailed explanations). Therefore,
any supplier reporting to be the low type must be telling the truth, and it
is optimal not to audit the reported low type. The information rent of the
low type supplier, however, is reduced from

qhN to (1

xh ) qhA . This is

exactly the potential benefit of the audit for the retailer. For the high type
supplier, he still earns no surplus, but the audit probability xh is positive.
This is because a low type supplier may pretend to be the high type, so it is
necessary for the retailer to use an audit to prevent misreporting. Further,
the audit brings the optimal price pA
h closer to the first-best solution (because
a positive xh brings va closer to ch ), thus mitigating the agency loss caused
by information asymmetry.
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Stage 1: Supplier’s Social Responsibility Level Choice
We now go back to stage 1 to optimize the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level ✓. Substituting optimal stage 2 decisions in Proposition 2.4 into
the supplier’s expected profit function ⇧r in Equation (2.4) yields
⇥
max ⇧s = wl tA
l
✓

= wl qhA (1

⇤
⇥
(cl + r(✓))qlA + wh tA
h

(ch + r(✓))qhA

xA
h ).

⇤

A
A
Note that xA
h is a function of ✓, and qh is a function of both ✓ and xh .

Therefore, theoretically speaking, ⇧r is a univariate function of the single
A
decision variable ✓. However, the complexity of the expressions for xA
h and qh

makes the above profit function less amenable to further analysis. To address
the tractability challenge, we make a variable transformation and express ⇧r
as a univariate function of xh instead.
The transformation begins with the fact that we have shown in the proof
of Proposition 2.4 that the retailer’s expected profit is jointly concave in
her decisions. In addition, the first order derivative with respect to xh is
@⇧r /@xh = wl qh

2Kwh xh . Setting it to zero yields wl qhA

= 2Kwh xA
h,

which can then be used to transform the supplier’s expected profit ⇧r as
follows:
max ⇧s = 2Kwh xA
h (1
✓

xA
h ).

(2.13)
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Using the chain rule, we can di↵erentiate ⇧s as follows:
d⇧s
@⇧s @xA
h
=
= 2Kwh (1
A
d✓
@xh @✓

A
A @xh
2xh )
.

(2.14)

@✓

Clearly, the stationary points of ⇧s are characterized by
2xA
h ) = 0. Note from Proposition 2.4 that

@xA
h
@✓

@xA
h
@✓

= 0 or (1

0

0

= 0 reduces to h (✓)

br (✓) =

0. Also, from Proposition 2.1, we have br0 (✓F ) = g 0 (✓F ). Therefore, ✓F is a
stationary point of ⇧s . The other stationary points come from (1

2xA
h ) = 0.

Substituting xA
h from Proposition 2.4, we get
wl wh
4Kwh2 b

2w

2 [a + g(✓)

l

1
b(vn + r(✓))] = .
2

(2.15)

It is straightforward to verify that xA
h is concave in ✓, which implies that
Equation (2.15) has at most two roots, denoted by ✓1 and ✓2 , where ✓1  ✓2 .
See Figure 2.2a for an illustration. Note that parametric conditions may also
lead to the case where Equation (2.15) has only one or even no root, as shown
in the other two panels of Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Solutions to Equation (2.15)
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In sum, ✓F is always a stationary point of the supplier’s expected profit
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function ⇧s . In addition, there might be up to two other stationary points
(✓1 and ✓2 ), depending on the parametric conditions. The following proposition summarizes the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level ✓A in three
possible scenarios.
Proposition 2.5. In the audit case, the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level ✓A is as follows:
(a) Scenario A: Equation (2.15) has two roots and ✓2  1. In this scenario,
✓1 < ✓F < ✓2 , and the supplier’s expected profit attains the same maximum value at both ✓1 and ✓2 , so ✓A could be either ✓1 or ✓2 . Further,
the retailer is indi↵erent to the supplier’s choice.
(b) Scenario B: Equation (2.15) has two roots and ✓2 > 1. In this scenario,
we have ✓A = ✓1 < ✓F .
(c) Scenario C: Equation (2.15) has at most one root. In this scenario,
✓A = ✓F .

Figure 2.3 plots the supplier’s expected profit ⇧s as a function of his
decision ✓ for us to visualize the three di↵erent scenarios described in the
proposition above. In scenario A (Figure 2.3a), ⇧s is bimodal. The stationary
point ✓F is a local minimizer and falls between the two maximizers ✓1 and
✓2 . Further, ⇧s attains the same value at both maximizers. Therefore, the
supplier is indi↵erent in regard to which one to choose. Interestingly, the
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retailer is indi↵erent too, as her expected profit remains constant at ✓1 and
✓2 . Since both players are indi↵erent, we assume ✓2 is chosen as the optimal
solution, i.e., ✓A = ✓2 , for the good of the public.
Figure 2.3: The Supplier’s Expected Profit ⇧s as a Function of ✓
(a) Scenario A

(b) Scenario B
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(c) Scenario C
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Scenario B in Figure 2.3b depicts the truncated version of scenario A,
which occurs when ✓2 , the larger root to Equation (2.15), falls beyond the
feasible region [0, 1]. Since ✓1 becomes the only maximizer in this scenario,
and clearly it is the supplier’s optimal choice. In scenario C (Figure 2.3c), ⇧s
is unimodal and attains its maximum at the only stationary point ✓F , which
is obvioiusly the supplier’s best decision.
Through previous analyses, we have found that information asymmetry
has no impact on the supplier’s optimal social responsibility choice. Proposition 2.5, however, reveals that an audit to counteract the adverse e↵ects of
information asymmetry may induce the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level to shift. In the presence of an audit, the supplier may increase (as in
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scenario A), decrease (scenario B), or maintain (scenario C) his social responsibility level, depending on parametric conditions. We explore how di↵erent
parameters a↵ect the supplier’s decision through extensive numerical studies
in Section 2.6.

2.5.

Multiplicative Demand Model

In Section 2.3.2, we have discussed that di↵erent consumer reactions to the
social responsibility level of a supply chain may lead to additive or multiplicative demand functions. This section examines the latter case, i.e., the
multiplicative demand model, as described in Equation 2.2. We begin with
the complete information case, which can serve as a benchmark, before proceeding to the no-audit case (asymmetric information case without an audit)
and the audit case. Much of the formulation and analysis in this section
parallel those in the additive demand model, so we will not repeat all the
details whenever confusion is not caused by such omissions.

2.5.1

First-Best Case: Complete Information

If the retailer has complete information about the supplier’s unit production
cost ci when designing the contracts, she will apparently extract all surplus of
the supplier by setting the transfer payment exactly equals to the supplier’s
total production cost, i.e., ti = (ci + r(✓))qi .
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The retailer’s expected profit, which is the same as the supply chain profit,
is as follows:
X

max ⇧r =
pi

wi [pi

ci

r(✓)](a

bpi )g(✓).

(2.16)

i=l,h

The following lemma provides the optimal first-best solutions.
Lemma 2.2. In the first-best case, the retailer’s optimal menu of contracts
is as follows: for i 2 {l, h}, the optimal price is pFi =

1
2b [a + b(ci

+ r(✓))], the

optimal transfer payment is tFi = [ci + r(✓)]qiF , and the corresponding demand
is qiF = 12 [a

b(ci + r(✓))]g(✓).

Next, we substitute the optimal decisions into Equation (2.16) to get the
following retailer’s optimal expected profit, which is also the optimal expected
profit for the supply chain.
⇧Fr =

X g(✓)
wi [a
4b

b(ci + r(✓)]2 .

(2.17)

i=l,h

Since the supplier always earns zero profit and thus is indi↵erent to the
choice of ✓, we assume that his optimal decision ✓F , characterized in the
following proposition, maximizes the supply chain profit.
Proposition 2.6. In the first-best case, the supplier’s expected profit is always
0. Under a mild sufficient condition

g 00 (✓)
g 0 (✓)

[a

b(wl cl + wh ch + r(✓))]+br0 (✓) <

0, the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level, denoted by ✓F , can be
characterized by the following equation:
⇥
⇤
2br0 (✓F ) a b wl cl + wh ch + r(✓F )
g 0 (✓F )
=
.
g(✓F )
wl [a b (cl + r(✓F ))]2 + wh [a b (ch + r(✓F ))]2

(2.18)
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It is worth noting that the condition

g 00 (✓)
g 0 (✓)

[a

b(wl cl + wh ch + r(✓))] +

br0 (✓) < 0 is sufficient, but not necessary, to guarantee the unimodality of
the supplier’s expected profit function. Our extensive numerical experiments
show that this condition is easily satisfied.

2.5.2

Second-Best Case: Asymmetric Information without an Audit

The retailer’s optimal contract design problem in stage 2 can be formulated
in exactly the same way as in the no-audit case in Section 2.4.2, except that
now the demand function is given in Equation (2.2). Therefore, we omit the
formulation to avoid repetition. Also, following exactly the same solution
procedure (as in the proof of Proposition 2.2), we can simplify the retailer’s
expected profit as follows:
max ⇧r =

{pi ,ti }

X

wi (pi qi

ti )

i=l,h

= wl [pl

cl

r(✓)] ql + wh [ph

vn

r(✓)] qh .

(2.19)

The optimal solutions are presented in the following proposition, which
parallels Proposition 2.2. As we can see, all results closely mimic those in the
additive model.
Proposition 2.7. In the no-audit case , the retailer’s optimal menu of con-
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tracts is as follows:
2 3 2
3 2 3 2
3
1
1
N
N
6pl 7 6 2b [a + b(cl + r(✓))] 7 6ph 7 6 2b [a + b(vn + r(✓))]7
4 5=4
5, 4 5 = 4
5,
N
N
N
N
N
tl
(cl + r(✓))ql + qh
th
(ch + r(✓))qh
and the corresponding demand is qlN =
1
2 [a

1
2 [a

b(cl + r(✓))]g(✓) and qhN =

b(vn + r(✓))]g(✓).
In the stage 1 problem, the supplier chooses the optimal social responsi-

bility level to maximize his own expected profit ⇧s . We substitute results in
the above proposition to simplify ⇧s as follows:
⇥
max ⇧s = wl tN
l
✓

⇤
⇥
(cl + r(✓))qlN + wh tN
h

= wl qhN =

1
wl
2

[a

⇤
(ch + r(✓))qhN ,

b(vn + r(✓)] g(✓).

(2.20)

Proposition 2.8. In the no-audit case, the optimal decision ✓N can be characterized by:
g 0 (✓N )
=
g(✓N )
a

br0 (✓N )
.
b(vn + r(✓N ))

(2.21)

A comparison between Propositions 2.8 and 2.6 shows that in stark contrast to the additive demand model, information asymmetry plays a more
active role and does change the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level
in the multiplicative demand case. Compared with the additive demand
model, the demand is scaled by g(✓) in multiplicative demand model. Thus,
the profit functions in the first-best and the second-best are scaled di↵erently,
which leads a change in the optimal social responsibility level.
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2.5.3

Audit Case: Asymmetric Information with an
Audit

Again, the retailer’s mechanism design problem in stage 2 mimics its counterpart in the additive demand model studied in Section 2.4.3, with the only
exception that the demand function is now given in Equation (2.2). Following
similar steps to those outlined in the proof of Proposition 2.4, we simplify
the retailer’s expected profit as follows:
max ⇧r = wl g(✓)(a

{pl ,ph ,xh }

+wh g(✓)(a
Proposition 2.9. Assume 4Kwh2

bpl ) [pl

(cl + r(✓))]

bph ) [ph
bg(1)

2

va

wh Kx2h .

r(✓)]

(2.22)

wl2 > 0 in the audit case, then

the retailer’s optimal menu of contracts is:
3
2 3 2
a+b(cl +r(✓))
A
2b
6 pl 7 6
7
6 7 6
7
6 xA 7 = 6
7,
0
7
6 l7 6
4 5 4
5
A
A
A
A
tl
[cl + r(✓)]ql + (1 xh ) qh
2

3

A
6 ph 7

2

a+b(vaA +r(✓))
2b

3

6
7
6 7 6
7
6xA 7 = 6 g(✓)wl wh
7
6 h 7 6 4Kwh2 bg(✓) 2 wl2 [a b(vn + r(✓))]7 ,
4 5 4
5
A
A
th
[ch + r(✓)]qh

and the corresponding demand is qlA =
1
2 [a

b(vaA + r(✓))]g(✓).

1
2 [a

b(cl + r(✓))]g(✓) and qhA =
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We observe that all results in this proposition are structurally identical
to those in the additive demand model counterpart Proposition 2.4. Since
g(✓) is an increasing function, the technical condition 4Kwh2

bg(1)

2

wl2 > 0

ensures the positivity of xA
h.
To solve for the supplier’s optimal social responsibility level in stage 1,
we substitute results in Proposition 2.9, along with the fact that wl qhA =
2Kwh xA
h (which is straightforward to verify based on results in Proposition 2.9
by noting that vaA is a function of xA
h ), to simplify the supplier’s expected
profit as follows:
max ⇧s = wl (1
✓

A
A
xA
h ) qh = 2Kwh xh (1

xA
h ),

(2.23)

which turns out to be structurally identical to Equation (2.13) in the additive
case. As a result, the analysis of the stationary points is the same as before,
that is, the stationary points of the supplier’s expected profit ⇧s , as a function
of ✓, are characterized by
that now the solution to

@xA
h
@✓

@xA
h
@✓

= 0 or (1

2xA
h ) = 0. The only di↵erence is

= 0, denoted by ✓s , does not correspond to the

first-best solution ✓F , and the roots to (1

2xA
h ) = 0 have di↵erent values

than in the additive demand model.
The following proposition, which parallels its counterpart Proposition 2.5
in the additive demand model, summarizes the optimal solutions in the multiplicative demand model.
Proposition 2.10. In the audit case, the supplier’s optimal social responsi-
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A

bility level ✓ is as follows:
(a) Scenario A: Equation (2.15) has two roots and ✓2  1. In this scenario, ✓1 < ✓s < ✓2 , and the supplier’s expected profit attains the same
maximum value at both ✓1 and ✓2 , so ✓A could be either ✓1 or ✓2 .
(b) Scenario B: Equation (2.15) has two roots and ✓2 > 1. In this scenario,
we have ✓A = ✓1 < ✓s .
(c) Scenario C: Equation (2.15) has at most one root. In this scenario,
✓ A = ✓s .

This proposition is identical to Proposition 2.5, except one di↵erence in
scenario A. Recall that in the additive demand model, both the supplier and
the retailer are indi↵erent to the two maximizers ✓1 and ✓2 . In the multiplicative demand model, the supplier is still indi↵erent. It is, however, no longer
the case for the retailer. As a result, let us designate the retailer’s preferred
choice as the optimal solution ✓A . The following proposition examines the
retailer’s preference.
Proposition 2.11. In scenario A, the retailer prefers ✓1 if
4Kwh2

>b

2

Otherwise, her preference is ✓2 .

p
g(✓1 )g(✓2 )wl (1 + wh )wl .
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It is worth mentioning that based on numerical experience, more often
than not, ✓1 is the better choice for the retailer. This is because the condition
p
4Kwh2 > b 2 g(✓1 )g(✓2 )wl (1 + wh )wl bears a resemblance to the technical
condition 4Kwh2

bg(1)

2

wl2 > 0, which is required for results in Proposi-

tion 2.9 to be positive. Figure 2.4 illustrates the case where ✓1 outperforms
✓2 from the retailer’s perspective. As can be seen from the figure, the supplier’s expected profit, represented by the solid line, is bimodal with the same
maximum value at both ✓1 and ✓2 . However, the retailer’s expected profit,
represented by the dashed line, indicates that she can garner a higher profit
at ✓1 .
Figure 2.4: Scenario A in the Multiplicative Demand Model
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Note that the optimal decision in scenario B is always ✓A = ✓1 . Therefore,
the above discussion suggests that there is a good chance for the supplier to
choose ✓1 as his optimal decision in the presence of an audit. If ✓1 happens to
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be less than the second-best decision ✓ , then the audit is well likely to have
N

an unintended negative consequence — it may lead the supplier to a lower
level of social responsibility.

2.5.4

Summary of Managerial Insights

Before concluding this section, we summarize managerial insights provided
by our modeling results. As we have discussed earlier, di↵erent consumer
reactions to a supply chain’s social responsibility level result in di↵erent demand functions. Our analyses in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 show that the di↵erent
demand functions, in turn, may lead to di↵erent impact of the audit on the
supplier’s social responsibility choice.
In the additive demand model, the information asymmetry plays no role
in the supplier’s decision, namely, it does not change the supplier’s social
responsibility level at all. As an audit is intended to counteract the adverse
e↵ects of the information asymmetry, one might intuit that the audit would
not shift the supplier’s decision. However, this turns out not to be the case.
We find that the audit may actually alter the supplier’s choice. Specifically,
the supplier may increase, decrease, or maintain his social responsibility level
in the presence of an audit, depending on di↵erent parametric conditions.
The next section investigates numerically how di↵erent parameters prompt
the supplier to modify his behavior.
The multiplicative demand model uncovers a di↵erent set of insights. In
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this case, the supplier, in response to his information advantage under information asymmetry, always chooses a di↵erent social responsibility level than
the first-best solution. We use numerical examples in the next section to
explore the direction and magnitude of the change caused by the information
asymmetry. Under the threat of an audit, the supplier may increase, decrease,
or maintain his social responsibility level, compared with the no-audit case.
Our theoretical analysis predicts that he is more likely to lower his social
responsibility, which is confirmed by our extensive numerical experiments.
In sum, a key takeaway from our modeling analysis is that while cost
auditing could be an e↵ective tool for the retailer to mitigate the adverse
e↵ects of the asymmetric information possessed by the supplier, she should
be mindful of the potential unintended consequence — the supplier may
respond to the audit with a lower social responsibility level, which is not
in the interest of the public. Further, it is important for us to understand
consumers’ attitude toward corporate social responsibility, as it drives how
the supplier reacts to the audit.

2.6.

Numerical Analysis

So far, we have analytically characterized the supplier’s optimal social responsibility decisions with and without an audit. The complexity of the optimal
solutions, however, still leaves open our key research question: how does the
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supplier vary his decision in response to an audit? In particular, what is the
directional change from the complete information case to the no-audit case
and then to the audit case, especially in the multiplicative demand model?
Further, how does each parameter a↵ect the supplier’s reaction? This section
employs a comprehensive numerical study to address these questions.
Recall that the trade-o↵s involved in the social responsibility level are
reflected in the concave increasing function g(✓) and convex increasing function r(✓). We find that the qualitative insights remain intact regardless of
the various functional forms we tried for the two functions. Therefore, we
p
report our results based on the following: g(✓) = G ✓ and r(✓) = R✓2 , which
can be used to simplify some analytical results obtained earlier, as detailed
in the following corollary.
p
Corollary 1. Given the functions g(✓) = G ✓ and r(✓) = R✓2 , the following
results hold:
(a) In the additive demand model, ✓F = ✓N =

G
4bR

2
3

. They are increas-

ing in G, decreasing in b and R, and independent of other parameters
(a, ch , cl , wl and K).
(b) In the multiplicative demand model, the first-best solution ✓F is decreasing in R and independent of G and K. The second-best solution
h
i
wl
a
N
2
✓ solves 5R✓ = b
ch + wh (ch cl ) . It is increasing in a, cl , wh ,
decreasing in b, R, ch , wl , and independent of G, K.
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Table 2.1: Parameters in the Numerical Experiment

Additive Demand

Multiplicative Demand

Parameters

*

Base Value

Range

Step Size

Base Value

Range

Step Size

a

200

[150, 300]

1

200

[100, 300]

1

b

2

[0.8, 3]

0.02

2

[0.5, 3.5]

0.02

G

180

[100, 250]

1

10

[5, 30]

0.1

R

60

[25, 150]

1

60

[30, 300]

2

ch

20

[17, 23]

0.05

20

[16, 23]

0.05

cl

14

[11, 19]

0.05

14

[10, 19]

0.05

wl

0.75

[0.5, 0.8]

0.002

0.75

[0.5, 0.8]

0.002

K

2000

[1750, 2500]

10

5000

[1800,10000]

50

Note that the parameter wh is omitted for brevity, due to the fixed relationship wh = 1

wl .

Table 2.1 describes parameters used in our experiment design. Note that
the base values of certain parameters di↵er in the additive and multiplicative
demand models to meet di↵erent regularity conditions (to ensure positive
demand and decisions) across the two models.
Figure 2.5 plots the supplier’s optimal social responsibility levels ✓F (in
the complete information case), ✓N (in the no-audit case), and ✓A (in the audit case) under the additive demand model. It also shows how each parameter
a↵ects these optimal solutions. As we can see, the impact of parameters on
✓A falls into two distinct patterns. In all sub-figures on the left-hand side, the
first segment of ✓A overlaps with ✓F and ✓N , corresponding to scenario C described in Proposition 2.5. The second segment of ✓A corresponds to scenario
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Figure 2.5: The Supplier’s Optimal Social Responsibility Level in the Additive Demand Model
(a) The Impact of the Parameter a

(b) The Impact of the Parameter b
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A in Proposition 2.5, and is equal to ✓2 . Once ✓2 exceeds its upper support
1, we enter the last segment of ✓A , which is now equal to ✓1 , corresponding
to scenario B in Proposition 2.5. To understand why ✓A varies in such a way,
let us take the parameter a for example. Technically, the first segment is the
same as ✓F , which is invariant to a. The last two segments are obtained when
Equation (2.15) has two roots ✓1 < ✓2 , as depicted in Figure 2.2a. When a
increases, the left-hand side of Equation (2.15) also increases, which means
the curve in Figure 2.2a will shift up. As a result, the smaller root ✓1 will
move to the left, and the larger root ✓2 will move to the right. This explains
why the second segment is increasing while the last segment is decreasing
in Figure 2.5a. Intuitively, the audit probability, as depicted in Figure 2.6a,
is relatively small in the low range of a, so the supplier is not incentivized
enough to deviate from ✓F or ✓N . When a reaches a certain threshold, the
threat of an audit is higher and the supplier is pressured to react. To gauge
the supplier’s reaction, it is useful to note from Equation (2.13) that his expected profit is proportional to a + g(✓)

b(vn + r(✓)). In the intermediate

range of a, the market potential a + g(✓) is more sensitive to changes in g(✓),
as g(✓) accounts for a relatively big chunk of the total market potential. An
increase in ✓ can boost the market potential relatively significantly, which
outpaces the negative impact of the production cost increase. Therefore, the
supplier is inclined to increase ✓ in this range. If a is already large enough,
then the market potential is less sensitive to changes in g(✓). In such a case,
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the supplier turns out to be better o↵ if he reduces ✓, as the demand decrease
is more than o↵set by the cost savings.
Figure 2.6: The Optimal Audit Probability for the High Type as a Function of the Parameter a
(a) Additive Demand Model
1.0

(b) Multiplicative Demand Model
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In all sub-figures on the right-hand side, the pattern is flipped — the three
segments of ✓A correspond to scenarios B, A, and C, respectively. We omit
details of further discussion as the underlying logic is similar.
In the multiplicative demand model, the supplier’s optimal social responsibility levels ✓F , ✓N , and ✓A are plotted in Figure 2.7. Similar to the additive
demand case, the impact of parameters on ✓A exhibits two di↵erent patterns.
In all sub-figures on the left-hand side, the first segment of ✓A corresponds
to scenario C in Proposition 2.10, and the second segment corresponds to
scenarios A and B. It is worth mentioning that in all examples, the retailer
prefers ✓1 to ✓2 in scenario A, which means that scenario A e↵ectively turns
into scenario B. This explains why, unlike in the additive demand model,
there is no third segment. The interpretation of why ✓A varies in such a fashion with parameters, say a, is also similar to before. The pattern is flipped
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Figure 2.7: The Supplier’s Optimal Social Responsibility Level in the Multiplicative Demand
Model
(a) The Impact of the Parameter a

(b) The Impact of the Parameter b
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in sub-figures on the right-hand side.
Note that the results in the multiplicative demand model depart from
those in the additive demand model in a few dimensions. First, either ✓F or ✓N
could dominate each other (e.g., Figure 2.7a), which means the information
asymmetry can cause the supplier to either increase or decrease his social
responsibility level. However, the change is typically not significant, as can be
seen from the relatively narrow gap between ✓F and ✓N . Second, we observe
that ✓A is always di↵erent from ✓F and ✓N . In other words, under the threat
of an audit, the supplier would always adjust his social responsibility level.
Third, and more important, in cases where the supplier increases his social
responsibility level in response to the audit (i.e., ✓A > ✓N ), the increase is
usually limited. However, if the supplier is to decrease his social responsibility
level, the reduction could be much more noticeable (e.g., towards the upper
support of the parameter a in Figure 2.7a). This presents a unique risk in
the multiplicative demand setting.
To summarize, cost auditing could be very beneficial. In some cases, it
could not only mitigate the adverse e↵ects of the information asymmetry, but
also induce the supplier to adopt a higher social responsibility level. Under
certain parametric conditions, however, it may decrease the supplier’s social
responsibility level, and the reduction could be substantial. Therefore, it is
crucial for practitioners to take the business environment into account when
considering a cost audit.
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2.7.

Conclusion and Future Research

Despite rapidly growing recognition of the importance of CSR, many firms
are still found to under-invest in their CSR initiatives. Motivated by this perplexing observation, we study the impact of cost auditing on the supplier’s
social responsibility level in this paper. We consider a two-tier supply chain
consisting of a supplier, whose production cost is his private information,
and a retailer, who uses an incentive contract coupled with an audit to induce the supplier to truthfully report his cost type. In our model framework,
we formulate a two-stage game where the supplier determines his social responsibility level in the first stage, followed by the retailer’s optimal audit
mechanism design in the second stage.
Both the customer demand and the production cost depend on the supplier’s social responsibility decision. To capture di↵erent consumer responses
to the supplier’s social responsibility, we examine both the additive and the
multiplicative demand models. In each demand model, we analyze three
cases, including the complete information (first-best), no-audit (second-best),
and audit cases. We characterize the optimal solutions and compare the supplier’s optimal decisions to understand how his decision is driven by the
information asymmetry and cost auditing. In addition, we conduct extensive
numerical studies to evaluate the e↵ects of various model parameters on the
supplier’s decision.
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Our findings suggest that a downstream firm’s seemingly unrelated common practices may often inadvertently undermine the supplier’s social responsibility choice, which sheds light on the reluctance of many suppliers to
commit to social responsibility programs.
As a first step towards understanding how common practices in supply
chains may deter the upstream supplier’s social responsibility e↵ort, we adopt
a stylized model in a simplified supply chain network. Future research directions might include adding a demand noise and expanding the bilateral
monopoly to incorporate horizontal competition. In addition, the consideration of audit evasion by the supplier could also provide more insights.
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2.8.

Appendix

2.8.1

Appendix A: Summary of Notation

The notation we use is summarized below.
Decision of the supplier (agent):
✓

supplier’s level of social responsibility, ✓ 2 [0, 1]

Decisions of the retailer (principal):
pi

unit selling price for the product pi ⌘ p(ci ), i 2 {l, h}

ti

transfer payments from the retailer ti ⌘ t(ci ), i 2 {l, h}

xi

the probability with which the retailer audits the supplier

Parameters:
r(✓)

the supplier’s social responsibility level related unit production cost

g(✓)

additional customer demand boosted by supplier’s social
responsibility level

qi (✓)

customer demand of the product,
qi = a + g(✓)

bpi , i 2 {l, h} a, b > 0

ci

type i supplier’s unit production cost, i 2 {l, h}

wi

the probability of supplier’s cost type ci , i 2 {l, h}

oi

the penalty for the supplier if the audit reveals that he misreports
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his cost type
K

the coefficient of the cost the retailer incurs (Kx2i ) to conduct
the audit, K > o
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2.8.2

Appendix B: Technical Proofs

Proof of Lemma 2.1
Evidently, the optimization problem is separable in the two decisions pl
and ph . Taking the first order derivative of the retailer’s expected profit in
Equation (2.5) with respect to pl yields
@⇧r
= wl [a + g(✓)
@pl

2bpl + b(cl + r(✓))].

It is straightforward to verify that the second order derivative with respect
to pl is

2bwl < 0, which established the concavity of the objective function in

pl . The optimal solution then directly follows from the first order condition
(i.e., setting the first order derivative to 0). Similar steps are followed to
⌅

derive the optimal price pFh corresponding to the high type.

Proof of Proposition 2.1
Taking the first order derivative of the optimal supply chain expected
profit in Equation (2.6) with respect to ✓ yields
X wi
@⇧Fr
=
[a + g(✓)
@✓
2b

b(ci + r(✓))][g 0 (✓)

br0 (✓)],

(2.24)

i=l,h

which is the product of two factors. Note that the first factor a + g(✓)
b(ci + r(✓)) is the customer demand when price is set to cost, which clearly
should be positive. This implies that the stationary points should satisfy
g 0 (✓)

br0 (✓) = 0.
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Next, we take the second order derivative as follows:
X wi
@ 2 ⇧Fr
=
[g 0 (✓)
2
@✓
2b

br0 (✓)]2 + [a + g(✓)

b(ci + r(✓))][g 00 (✓)

br00 (✓)] .

i=l,h

(2.25)

Evaluating the second order derivative at stationary points yields
@ 2 ⇧Fr
@✓2

@⇧F
r
@✓

=0

X wi
=
{[g 00 (✓)
2b

br00 (✓)][a + g(✓)

b(ci + r(✓))]} < 0,

i=l,h

where the last inequality follows from our assumptions that g(✓) is concave
increasing and r(✓) is convex increasing in ✓. Since the second order derivative
is negative at all stationary points, this implies that ⇧Fr is unimodal in ✓, and
the first order condition characterizes the optimal solution ✓F , as stated in
⌅

the proposition.

Proof of Proposition 2.2
We take the following 4 steps to prove this proposition. The first three
steps explore basic properties of the constraints, which enables us to eliminate
the transfer payments th and tl from the objective function in the last step,
thus reducing the dimensionality of the optimization problem.
• Step 1: we first show that the constraint IRl is redundant.
If IRh and ICl are satisfied, by adding IRh and ICl , we have tl
r(✓)]ql

qh

0.

[cl +
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Thus, as long as ICl and IRh are satisfied, IRl is always satisfied,
which means the low cost type supplier always generates a nonnegative
surplus. Further, IRl is not binding unless the supplier’s production
quantity for the high cost type is 0 (i.e., qh = 0).
• Step 2: we prove that the constraint IRh must be binding, i.e., th =
(ch + r(✓))qh .
If IRh is not binding, i.e., if th > (ch + r(✓))qh , the retailer can always
decrease the transfer payments th and tl by the same amount to increase
her profit, because such a change keeps ICl and ICh satisfied. Thus,
IRh must be binding, i.e., th = (ch + r(✓))qh .
• Step 3: we prove that the constraint ICl must be binding.
Substituting th = (ch + r(✓)) ⇤ qh from the previous step into the constraint ICl yields
tl
In other words, tl
(cl + r(✓))ql +

(cl + r(✓))ql

(cl + r(✓))ql +

qh .

qh . If ICl is not binding, i.e., if tl >

qh , the retailer would decrease the transfer payment tl

until it equals to (cl + r(✓))ql +

qh to increase her profit without

violating other constraints. Therefore, ICl must be binding, which
implies that tl = (cl + r(✓))ql +

qh .

• Step 4: objective function simplification and optimization.
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Substituting the expressions for the transfer payments th and tl from
previous steps, we can simplify the retailer’s expected profit as follows:
max ⇧r = wl (pl ql

tl ) + wh (ph qh

{pl ,ph }

= wl [pl ql

(cl + r(✓))ql

th )


qh ] + wh [ph qh (ch + r(✓))qh ]
✓
◆
wl
ph
ch +
r(✓) qh
wh

= wl [pl

cl

r(✓)] ql + wh

= wl [pl

cl

r(✓)] ql + wh [ph

= wl [pl

cl

r(✓)] [a + g(✓)

+wh [ph

vn

vn

r(✓)] qh

bpl ]

r(✓)] [a + g(✓)

bph ].

Taking the first order derivative of the expected profit with respect to
pl yields
@⇧r
= wl [a + g(✓)
@pl

2bpl + b(cl + r(✓))].

It is straightforward to verify that the second order derivative with respect to pl is

2bwl < 0, which establishes the concavity of the objective

function in pl and the optimal solution then directly follows from the
first order condition. Similar steps are followed to derive the optimal
price pN
h corresponding to the high type.

⌅

Proof of Proposition 2.3
Taking the first order derivative of the supplier expected profit in Equa-
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tion (2.8) with respect to ✓ yields
@⇧s
1
= wl [ br0 (✓) + g 0 (✓)].
@✓
2
Next, we take the second order derivative as follows:
@ 2 ⇧s
1
=
wl [ br00 (✓) + g 00 (✓)].
2
@✓
2
Since r(✓) is convex increasing in ✓ and g(✓) is concave increasing in ✓,
we have r0 (✓) > 0, g 0 (✓) > 0 and r00 (✓) > 0, g 00 (✓) < 0. As a result, the second
order derivative is negative and the optimal decision ✓N follows from the first
order condition.

⌅

Proof of Proposition 2.4
We make a claim upfront to facilitate our further discussion. The claim
is the retailer does not need to audit a supplier claiming that he is efficient
type, cl (i.e.,xl = 0). Because the supplier with inefficient type, ch , does not
have incentive to pretend to be a supplier with efficient type, cl . Thus, if a
supplier claims that he produces with a cost type, cl , he must tell the truth.
We take the following 5 steps to prove this proposition. The first four steps
explore basic properties of the constraints, which enables us to eliminate the
transfer payments th and tl from the objective function in the last step, thus
reducing the dimensionality of the optimization problem.
• Step 1: we first prove that the constraint IRh must be binding, i.e.,
th = (ch + r(✓))qh .
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If IRh is not binding, i.e., if th > (ch + r(✓))qh , the retailer can always
decrease the transfer payments th and tl by the same amount to increase
her profit, because such a change keeps ICl and ICh satisfied. Thus,
IRh must be binding, i.e., th = (ch + r(✓))qh .
• Step 2: we show that the constraint IRl is redundant.
The The Maximal Punishment Principle (Border and Sobel, 1987) implies that Equation (2.10) must be binding, i.e., th

(cl + r(✓))qh = ol .

Substituting th = ch + r(✓))qh from the previous step yields ol =
th

(cl + r(✓))qh =

qh .

If IRh and ICl are satisfied, by adding IRh and ICl , we have tl
r(✓)]ql

qh

xh ol = (1

x h ) qh

[cl +

0. Thus, as long as ICl and IRh

are satisfied, IRl is always satisfied, which means the low cost type
supplier always generates a nonnegative surplus. Further, IRl is not
binding unless the supplier’s production quantity for the high cost type
is 0 (i.e., qh = 0).
• Step 3: we prove that the constraint ICl must be binding.
Substituting th = (ch +r(✓))qh from step 1 into the constraint ICl yields
tl
In other words, tl

(cl + r(✓))ql

(1

(cl + r(✓))ql + (1

x h ) qh .
xh ) qh . If ICl is not bind-

ing, i.e., if tl is strictly greater than (cl + r(✓))ql + (1

xh ) qh , the
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retailer would decrease the transfer payment tl until it equals to (cl +
r(✓))ql + (1

xh ) qh to increase her profit without violating other

constraints. Therefore, ICl must be binding, which implies that tl =
(cl + r(✓))ql + (1

x h ) qh .

• Step 4: we prove that the audit probability for the low type supplier is
xl = 0.
To prove this result, let us revisit the no-audit case studied in Section 2.4.2. Using results in Proposition 2.2, we can simplify the constraint ICh to 0

(qhN

qlN ), which can be easily verified to hold

with strict inequality. In other words, the high type supplier is strictly
better-o↵ reporting his true type. Since there is no incentive for the
high type supplier to lie, any supplier reporting to be the low type
must be telling the truth. Therefore, an audit of the (reported) low
type should be avoided as the audit is costly and does not add any
value. In conclusion, xl = 0.
• Step 5: objective function simplification and optimization.
Substituting xl = 0 and the expressions for the transfer payments th
and tl from previous steps, we can simplify the retailer’s expected profit
in Equation (2.13) to an optimization problem with three remaining
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decisions pl , ph , and xh as follows:
max ⇧r = wl (pl ql

{pl ,ph ,xh }

tl ) + wh (ph qh

Kx2h )

th

= wl [pl ql (cl + r(✓))ql (1 xh ) qh ]
⇥
⇤
+wh ph qh (ch + r(✓))qh Kx2h

✓
wl
= wl [pl cl r(✓)] ql + wh ph
ch +
(1
wh
wh Kx2h

= wl [a + g(✓)
+wh [a + g(✓)

bpl ] [pl

cl

bph ] [ph

xh )

◆

r(✓) qh

r(✓)]
va

r(✓)]

wh Kx2h .

We observe that the above optimization problem is separable in pl and
the pair {ph , xh }, as there are no cross terms between pl and ph or xh .
Taking the first order derivative of the expected profit with respect to
pl yields
@⇧r
= wl [a + g(✓)
@pl

2bpl + b(cl + r(✓))].

It is straightforward to verify that the second order derivative with respect to pl is

2bwl < 0, which establishes the concavity of the objective

function in pl . The optimal solution pA
l then directly follows from the
first order condition.
For the remaining two decisions {ph , xh }, we obtain the Hessian matrix
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as follows:

2
6
4

2bwh
b wl

whose determinant is b(4Kwh2
4Kwh2

b

2

3

b

b wl 7
5,
2Kwh

2

wl2 ). Given the assumption that

wl2 > 0, the Hessian matrix is negative definite, implying

that the retailer’s expected profit is jointly concave in ph and xh . The
two first order derivatives are (note that va is a function of xh ):
@⇧r
= wh [a + g(✓) 2bph + b(va + r(✓))],
@ph
@⇧r
= wl [a + g(✓) bph ] 2Kwh xh .
@xh
A
The optimal solutions pA
h and xh are derived from solving the two first

⌅

order conditions simultaneously.

Proof of Proposition 2.5
Through the analyses in the main text, we already know that the supplier’s expected profit ⇧s in Equation (2.13) may have up to three stationary
points. Our remaining task is to determine which stationary point(s) is/are
the global maximizer(s) of ⇧s . To that end, we take the second order derivative of ⇧s with respect to ✓ as follows:
" ✓
◆2
2
d ⇧s
@xA
h
2
=
+ (1
d✓2
@✓

2 A
A @ xh
2xh ) 2
@✓

#

.

(2.26)

As the number of stationary points depends on the number of roots to
Equation (2.15), we examine the following three cases:
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• Case 1: If Equation (2.15) has two di↵erent roots ✓1 and ✓2 , as illustrated in Figure 2.2a, then there are three stationary points ✓1 , ✓2 , and
✓F . We next examine if they are local maximizers or minimizers. From
Equation (2.26), we know that evaluated at either ✓1 or ✓2 , the second
⇣ A ⌘2
@x
d 2 ⇧s
order derivative d✓2 = 2 @✓h
< 0. Therefore, both ✓1 and ✓2 are
local maximizers.

At ✓F , however, we can see from Equation (2.26) that the second order
derivative

d 2 ⇧s
d✓2

is equal to 0, because

@xA
h
@✓ ✓=✓F

= 0. Thus, we have

to resort to the first order derivative in Equation (2.14) for further
analysis. As can be seen from Figure 2.2a, we have 1
vicinity of ✓F . Further,

@xA
h
@✓

2xA
h < 0 in the

is positive on the left of ✓F , and negative

on the right of ✓F . Therefore,

d⇧s
d✓

is negative on the left of ✓F , and

positive on the right of ✓F . In other words, ✓F is a local minimizer of
⇧s .
In sum, in this case, the supplier’s profit function ⇧s is bimodal in ✓,
as illustrated in Figure 2.3b. Further, it is straightforward to obtain
that the supplier’s optimal expected profit is ⇧A
s = Kwh /2 at both
maxima. We next substitute optimal solutions in Proposition 2.4 into
A
Equation (2.13), and note that xA
h = 0.5 and wl qh

= 2Kwh xA
h =

Kwh . After some algebraic simplifications, we get the retailer’s optimal
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expected profit as follows:
( 
1
2Kwh b (1 + wh )
⇧A
=
wl
+
r xA
=0.5
h
4b
wl
2wh

2

+ wh



2Kwh
wl

2

)

Kwh
,
4

which turns out to be totally independent of ✓. This proves all claims
in scenario A of the proposition.
If ✓2 , the larger root of Equation (2.15), falls out of the feasible range,
then ✓1 becomes the only maximizer of ⇧s . This corresponds to scenario
B of the proposition.
• Case 2: If Equation (2.15) has a unique root, then ✓1 = ✓2 . In this
case, ✓1 , ✓2 , and ✓F all consolidate to the same point, as illustrated in
Figure 2.2b. We refer to this point as ✓F for convenience. As can be
seen from Figure 2.2b, on the left of ✓F , we have 1

2xA
h > 0, and

@xA
h
@✓

> 0, so

d⇧s
d✓

> 0. On the right of ✓F , we have 1

2xA
h > 0, and

@xA
h
@✓

< 0, so

d⇧s
d✓

< 0. In other words, ⇧s is increasing on the left of

✓F , but decreasing on the right of ✓F . Therefore, ⇧s attains its global
maximum at its only stationary point ✓F .
• Case 3: If Equation (2.15) has no root, as illustrated in Figure 2.2c,
then it means the parametric conditions are such that xA
h < 0.5 or
1

2xA
h > 0. Therefore, ⇧s , as a univariate function of ✓, has only one

stationary point ✓F , similar to case 2 above. It is straightforward to
verify that

@ 2 xA
h
@✓2

00

/ h (✓)

00

br (✓) < 0, where / stands for proportional

to, as we omitted some positive coefficients for convenience of notation.
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As a result, Equation (2.26) indicates that the second order derivative
d 2 ⇧s
d✓2

is negative at ✓F , thus confirming the only stationary point ✓F as

the global maximizer.
In both cases 2 and 3, the supplier’s expected profit ⇧s is unimodal, and
its only stationary point ✓F is the global maximizer. This corresponds to
⌅

scenario C of the proposition.

Proof of Lemma 2.2
Evidently, the optimization problem is separable in the two decisions pl
and ph . Taking the first order derivative of the retailer’s expected profit in
Equation (2.16) with respect to pl yields
@⇧r
= wl g(✓)[a
@pl

2bpl + b(cl + r(✓))].

It is straightforward to verify that the second order derivative with respect to pl is

2bwl g(✓) < 0, which established the concavity of the objective

function in pl . The optimal solution then directly follows from the first order
condition. Similar steps are followed to derive the optimal price pFh corresponding to the high type.

Proof of Proposition 2.6
The first order derivative of ⇧Fr with respect to ✓ is

⌅
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@⇧Fr
@✓

o
g 0 (✓) n
2
2
=
wl [a b (cl + r(✓))] + wh [a b (ch + r(✓))]
4b
g(✓)r0 (✓)
{a b [wl cl + wh ch + r(✓)]} ,
2

and the second order derivative can be simplified to the following:
@ 2 ⇧Fr
@✓2

g 00 (✓) n
=
wl [a
4b

b(cl + r(✓)] + wh [a

g 0 (✓)r0 (✓) {a

+

2

g(✓) 0 2
br (✓)
2

b(ch + r(✓))]

b [wl cl + wh ch + r(✓)]}
g(✓) 00
r (✓)(a
2

2

o

b (wl cl + wh ch + r(✓))).

Evaluating the second order derivative at the stationary point yields
@ 2 ⇧Fr
@✓2

@⇧F
r
@✓

=0


g(✓)r0 (✓) g 00 (✓)
=
[a
2
g 0 (✓)

b(wl cl + wh ch + r(✓))] + br0 (✓)

g 0 (✓)r0 (✓) [a

b (wl cl + wh ch + r(✓))]

g(✓) 00
r (✓)[a
2

b (wl cl + wh ch + r(✓))].

If it is negative, then ⇧Fr in unimodal in ✓, and the stationary point is the
optimal solution. Clearly, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the
above result to be negative is that

g 00 (✓)
g 0 (✓)

[a

b(wl cl + wh ch + r(✓))]+br0 (✓) < 0.

⌅

Proof of Proposition 2.7
All steps to prove this proposition are the same as those in the proof of
Proposition 2.2. Details are thus omitted for brevity.

⌅
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Proof of Proposition 2.8
The first order derivative of the supplier’s expected profit ⇧s in Equation (2.20) with respect to ✓ is
@⇧s
1
= wl
@✓
2

{g 0 (✓) [a

b(vn + r(✓)]

bg(✓)r0 (✓)} .

The second order derivative with respect to ✓ is
@ 2 ⇧s
1
=
wl
@✓2
2

{g 00 (✓) [a

b(vn + r(✓))]

g 0 (✓)r0 (✓)

b[g 0 (✓)r0 (✓) + g(✓)r00 (✓)]}
< 0,
where the inequality follows from the assumptions that g(✓) is concave increasing and r(✓) is convex increasing. Given the concavity of ⇧s , the optimal
decision ✓N can be characterized by the first order condition.

⌅

Proof of Proposition 2.9
All steps to simplify the retailer’s expected profit to Equation (2.22) are
identical to those in the proof of Proposition 2.4, and are thus omitted for
brevity.
We observe that the optimization problem in Equation (2.22) is separable
in pl and the pair {ph , xh }, as there are no cross terms between pl and ph or
xh . Taking the first order derivative of the expected profit with respect to pl
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yields
@⇧r
= wl g(✓) [a
@pl

2bpl + b(cl + r(✓))] ,

It is straightforward to verify that the second order derivative with respect to pl is

2bwl g(✓) < 0, which establishes the concavity of the objective

function in pl . The optimal solution pA
l then directly follows from the first
order condition.
For the remaining two decisions {ph , xh }, we obtain the Hessian matrix
as follows:

2

b wl g(✓) 7
5,
b wl g(✓)
2Kwh
⇥
⇤
whose determinant is bg(✓) 4Kwh2 bg(✓) 2 wl2 . Since g(✓) is concave in6
4

2bwh g(✓)

3

creasing in ✓ on its support [0, 1], the assumption that 4Kwh2 bg(1)

2

wl2 > 0

guarantees that the Hessian matrix is negative definite. Therefore, the retailer’s expected profit is jointly concave in ph and xh . The two first order
derivatives are (note that va is a function of xh ):
@⇧r
= wh [a 2bph + b(va + r(✓))]g(✓),
@ph
@⇧r
= wl [a bph ]g(✓) 2Kwh xh .
@xh
A
The optimal solutions pA
h and xh are derived from solving the two first

order conditions simultaneously.

Proof of Proposition 2.10

⌅

It suffices to show that ✓s , the solution to

@xA
h
@✓

70
= 0, is unique, as the

remaining analysis is exactly the same as in the additive demand model.
The first order derivative of xA
h with respect to ✓ is
⇢
@xA
w
w
l
h
h
=
bwl2 2 (a
@✓
[4Kwh2 bg(✓)wl2 2 ]2
⇥
⇤ @[g(✓)(a
+ 4Kwh2 bg(✓)wl2 2

bvn

br(✓))g(✓)

bvn
@✓

br(✓))]

@g(✓)
@✓

,

and the second order derivative, evaluated at the stationary point, can be
simplified to
@ 2 xA
h
2
@✓

@xA
h
@✓ =0

⇢
wl wh
@ 2 g(✓)
2 2
=
bw
g(✓)(a
bv
br(✓))
n
l
[4Kwh2 bg(✓)wl2 2 ]2
@✓2
 2
⇥
⇤
@ g(✓)
@g(✓) @r(✓)
@ 2 r(✓)
2
2 2
+ 4Kwh bg(✓)wl
2b
bg(✓)
@✓2
@✓ @✓
@✓2
< 0,

where the inequality follows from the assumptions that g(✓) is concave increasing and r(✓) is convex increasing. This implies that xA
h is unimodal in
⌅

✓. Therefore, the stationary point ✓s is unique.

Proof of Proposition 2.11
Note that xA
h = 0.5 in scenario A. Substituting this and other results in
Proposition 2.9 into the retailer’s expected profit yields the following after
some simplifications:
(
✓
◆2

1
1
2Kw
b(1 + wh )
h
⇧A
=
+ wl g(✓)
1
r xA
=
h
2
4b g(✓) wl
2wh

2

+ 2Kb(1 + wh )

)

wh K
.
4
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It is then straightforward to obtain the following:
⇧A
r (✓1 )

⇧A
r (✓2 ) /

✓

2Kwh
wl

◆2

g(✓1 )g(✓2 )wl

✓

b(1 + wh )
2wh

◆2

,

which implies that the retailer prefers ✓1 if and only if
✓

2Kwh
wl

◆2

g(✓1 )g(✓2 )wl

✓

b(1 + wh )
2wh

◆2

> 0.

After some algebraic simplifications, the above condition becomes
4Kwh2 > b

2

p
g(✓1 )g(✓2 )wl (1 + wh )wl .

(2.27)

Clearly, when the inequality sign in Equation (2.27) is reversed, then ✓2
is preferred by the retailer.

⌅

Proof of Corollary 1
• Part (a): the expressions for ✓F and ✓N come directly from Equap
tions (2.7) and (2.9) by substituting g(✓) = G ✓ and r(✓) = R✓2 .
The sensitivity analyses are straightforward.
• Part (b): From Equation (2.18), we obtain that ✓F solves the following
equation:
9(bR✓2 )2 10[a b(wl cl +wh ch )](bR✓2 )+[wl (a bcl )2 +wh (a bch )2 ] = 0,
which is quadratic in bR✓2 . It is straightforward to see that ✓F is
decreasing in R and independent of G and K.

The equation that characterizes ✓

N
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follows from Equation (2.21). The

sensitivity analyses are straightforward.

⌅

73

Chapter3
The Role of Live-Streaming Commerce in a
Dual-Channel Supply Chain

3.1.

Introduction

With the fast development of the Internet, customers’ consumption pattern
has been significantly changed and extended from traditional o✏ine shopping
to online shopping. We observe that a new business model has attracted
considerable attention and been increasingly adopted by many companies in
recent years: live-streaming commerce, which allows customers to “touch”,
“try”, and purchase a product without going outside. Compared with previous online shopping, live-streaming shopping provides a new and diverse
shopping experience through real-time communication and live interactions.
Consumers can view the product, ask questions, share opinions, and communicate with other viewers through a chat box in real-time. If consumers are
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convinced, they place an order over the phones through an embedded link during the live session. Compared with traditional o✏ine stores, live-streaming
shopping eliminates consumers’ transportation cost and the risk of product
shortage. Consumers receive more information instantly through interactions
and “try-on hauls” than simply browsing photos on websites. Live-streaming
shopping first launched on Taobao.com in 2016. According to iResearch,
China has 617 million live-streaming users at the end of 2020 and the livestreaming market is expected to exceed 4.9 trillion RMB in 2023 (iResearch,
2021). In recent years, many companies have started to adopt live-streaming
commerce and have created their own live-streaming sites, such as Facebook
and Amazon. YouTube is launching a new live-streaming shopping platform
to integrate live shopping into YouTube so that viewers can purchase the
product directly from the YouTube livestreamers they trust (The YouTube
Team, 2021).
A common practice in live-streaming commerce is that a supplier collaborates with professional livestreamers, referred as “key opinion leaders”
(KOLs), and sells products through the KOLs’ live-streaming channels. KOLs
normally have a stable audience pool and perform professionally in one or
several fields. Collaborating with a top KOL may boost product demand
tremendously. For example, Austin Li (Jiaqi Li), one of the most famous
livestreamers in China, sold $1 billion in goods in a 12-hour live-streaming
in October 2021, the month before Alibaba’s annual shopping festival, and
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the views reached 250 million in that session (Bloomberg, 2021). It is rare
to find another shopping method that can attract so many consumers at the
same time and boost demand in such a short period. In general, a supplier
could collaborate with a KOL in three di↵erent methods: “flash retailer”,
revenue-sharing, and two-part tari↵ contract. In “flash retailer”, the supplier sells products in the KOL’s stream by paying a fixed slotting fee, which
is a common practice when launching a new product. Supplier could reach
out a large audience pool and consumers are easier to convinced because of
the KOL’s endorsement. In revenue-sharing, a supplier designs a contract
with a KOL. The KOL keeps a percentage of the revenue of live-streaming
sales and the supplier earns the rest of the sales. A supplier may design a
two-part tari↵ contract with KOL, where the KOL charges lower price in the
live-streaming channel and a slotting fee to the supplier. In our paper, we
focus on the second method, revenue-sharing contract.
Despite the massive advantages of collaborating with KOLs, it comes with
a cost. Top KOLs always have strong bargaining power in price setting and
the supplier has to agree on a revenue-sharing contract to reach a collaboration. It may be surprising to see a KOL has so much control on live-streaming
channel, but in practice, some powerful KOLs would be able to manipulate
the live-streaming channel decisions due to their influential profile. For example, Austin Li helped a litter-known brand, Florasis, a Chinese cosmetics
brand founded in 2017, sold more than 700, 000 units setting powder on
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November 11, 2019, and became one of the top 10 color cosmetic brands during the Tmall Global Shopping Festival in the following years (Retail in Asia,
2022). Florasis’ Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) reaches $823.3 million in
2021, which almost doubles the GMV in 2020 (CosmeticsDesign-Asia, 2022).
In this case, Austin Li highly involved in the price setting process. Florasis
also benefits from the high demand in live-streaming channel and the potentially increased demand in traditional channel. In addition, KOLs charge
commission fees, normally 20 to 30 percent of the sales in the live session,
and leave the rest to the supplier (Yahoo!news, 2020). Some top KOLs also
charge slotting fees for promoting the product during a live session and the
commission fee can be as high as 60% to 70%. Many companies, especially
some small or start-up companies, are starting to train their own employees
and creating their own live-streaming channels. Instead of selling products on
a KOL’s stream by paying commission fees and sharing revenue, many companies operate their own shopping streams to maintain inventory efficiency,
enrich brand loyalty with customer engagement, build customer trust, and
improve demand forecasting.
For each channel, the owner has to have operation cost and media investment. For example, more media investment in advertising will cover a larger
market size, increase the product exposure to customers, and eventually boost
sales. Since live-streaming shopping has been widely employed by many companies as a new channel, it is important to understand the supplier’s supply
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chain strategies in adopting a live-streaming channel and whether or not to
collaborate with a KOL. In this paper, we consider four supply chain strategies: traditional channel only, live-streaming channel only, dual-channel with
self-streaming, and dual-channel with collaboration. We define the first three
strategies as “centralized settings” because the supplier decides the pricing
and media investment for all channels; we define the fourth strategy as a
“decentralized case” where the supplier decides the pricing and media investment for the traditional channel and the KOL makes optimal decisions for
the live-streaming channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the
literature review. In section 3, we describe the model framework. In section
4 and section 5, we calculate the optimal solutions in centralized settings and
one decentralized case. In section 6 we discuss the supplier’s choice among
di↵erent strategies. In section 7, we conclude our findings and propose future
research directions.

3.2.

Literature Review

This paper is the first to model live-streaming introduction in a dual-channel
setting with a theoretical method considering consumers’ preferences. We
explore the optimal equilibrium solutions and the impact of live-streaming
commerce on suppliers’ supply chain strategy given consumers’ di↵erent chan-
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nel preferences. The relevant literature can be divided into three areas:
dual-channel management, live-streaming commerce, and social influence and
celebrity endorsement.
The dual-channel management has gained much attention in operations
management and marketing. McGuire and Staelin (1983) investigate manufacturer’s choice between a company store and a decentralized distribution
system. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) explore the problems and solutions in
a coordination system and conclude that a quantity discount contract can
help to achieve the coordination. Rhee and Park (2000) present a hybrid
channel model by dividing customers into two segments: a price-sensitive
and a service-sensitive segment. Chiang et al. (2003) explain the benefit of
introducing a direct channel and how it benefits the manufacturer and the
retailer. Tsay and Agrawal (2004) study the channel conflict and coordination between manufacturer and retailer and provided a comprehensive review
of quantitative models in dual-channel management. Yue and Liu (2006) analyze the benefit of sharing demand forecast in a dual-channel supply chain.
Chen et al. (2008) consider a stochastic demand and add service and product availability competition for direct channel and retail stores. Cai (2010)
compare four supply chain structures and suggest two Pareto-zone for supplier and retailer’s channel selection. Wu et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2017)
adopts a utility function of a representative consumer to capture the demand
functions by maximizing consumer utility. In our model, we evaluate the
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trade-o↵ between an increasing market size by adopting the live-streaming
channel and a potential channel competition.
The second area is the study of live-streaming commerce. live-streaming
commerce is a new type of shopping experience that inherits characteristics from e-commerce and includes social media attributes that emend realtime interaction with livestreamer. Compared with traditional researches in
celebrity endorsement which focus on celebrity-product fit, livestreamer endorsement starts to consider the impact of the endorser-customer relationship
from the sellers’ perspective. Wongkitrungrueng and Assarut (2018) prove
that the customers’ trust in the seller, not the product, is directly associated
with customer engagement. Cheng et al. (2019) find that adopting a live
video streaming can significantly boosts online sales. Park and Lin (2020)
indicate that the congruence between the product and live content will increase customers’ purchase intention. Wongkitrungrueng et al. (2020) identify
adaptable strategies in live-streaming commerce from the seller’s perspective
and presents a comparison between live-streaming commerce, e-commerce,
and o✏ine commerce. Qi et al. (2021) compare manufacturer’s strategies
when contracting with two types of influencers: top influencer or regular influencer. We focus on the important aspects of the live-streaming channel
which have not been extensively studied, the impact of live-streaming channel on price setting and media investment in a dual-channel supply chain,
and suggests that the supplier’s profit may be lower by collaborating with an
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influencer than hosting a live-streaming channel.
The third area is the study of social influence and celebrity endorsement.
The problem of social influence and celebrity endorsement is widely studied in
marketing and has received considerable attention in the literature. La↵erty
and Goldsmith (1999) analyze the di↵erent impacts of an endorser and corporate credibility on customers’ attitudes towards the brand and purchase intentions. Kamins (1990) present a series of “match-up” hypotheses to explain
the importance between the celebrity, the brand, and the product-endorser
fit. Escalas and Bettman (2009) suggest that a mismatch between celebrity
and product can be less efficient and e↵ective. Liang et al. (2011) and Liang
and Turban (2011) present a framework that covers the key elements in social commerce and interprets the blooming of social commerce. Hackley and
Hackley (2015) propose that the relationship between customer, brand, and
celebrity is needed to be re-evaluated and re-shape with the fast development
of media convergence. Chung and Cho (2017) explore how the use of social
media a↵ects endorser e↵ectiveness and find that high trustworthy celebrity
can lead to a high purchase intention. Carlson et al. (2020) find that as long
as endorsers have a strong connection with the target audience, customers
still respond favorably to the endorsement even if the endorser-brand fit is
low, which explains why the livestreamer’s influencing factor plays such an
important role in the live-streaming marketing. Ye et al. (2021) provide an
overview of the current influencer marketing research and make recommen-
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dations for future research in this field. Notably, these papers have employed
a lot of di↵erent qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate the influence of celebrity-endorsement. Our research contributes to the theoretical
analysis and explores the impact of social influence on supplier’s profit.
This paper extends the literature related to dual-channel management,
live-streaming commerce, and social influence and celebrity-endorsement by
addressing the following research questions: (i) how does the live-streaming
channel influence level a↵ect regular channel demand? (ii) what are the
supplier’s pricing and media investment decisions in a dual-channel supply
chain? (iii) when should the supplier collaborate with a KOL?

3.3.

Model Framework

We consider a setting where a supplier sells a product through traditional
direct channel, live-streaming channel, or both. The supplier has two options when adopting a live-streaming channel, he can sell the product either through his own live-streaming channel or by collaborating with KOLs,
who have advantages in terms of influence level, consumers’ trust, audience
size, and product exposure. If the supplier chooses self-streaming, he decides
the prices and media investment for both channels given the live-streaming
channel influence level. If the supplier sells a product through a KOL’s livestreaming channel, the supplier decides the price and media investment of
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the traditional channel first and then the KOL makes decisions for the livestreaming channel. They will agree on a revenue-sharing contract and the
KOL takes a percentage of the sales in the live-streaming channel. The influence level can be measured by the number of subscribers, the conversation
rate, conversion rate, and the history of transaction data. It is rational to
assume that a KOL with a high influence level often requests a relatively high
revenue-sharing percentage.
Based on customers’ channel preferences, we divide customers into two
segments: one prefers traditional channel shopping and the other prefers livestreaming channel shopping. For the first segment, customers prefer to shop
through traditional channels, such as o✏ine stores or companies’ direct websites. However, this segment customers may purchase from a live-streaming
channel because of a traditional channel product shortage or the anticipation
of a lower price in the live-streaming channel. Similarly, in the second segment, customers are familiar with the live-streaming selling platforms and
prefer to purchase the product through live-streaming channel. Nevertheless,
the second segment customers may be interested in the product by watching
the live-streaming session but purchase the product from a traditional channel
due to the time-sensitive of the live-streaming session. In addition, we consider customer switching behavior, where customers abandon a competitor’s
brand and purchase a product from the supplier. We define these customers
as “outsiders”, which increase the potential market demand of live-streaming
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channel. It is reasonable to assume that outsiders only prefer live-streaming
shopping because customers with traditional channel preference from other
brands will not be attracted to the live-streaming channel and exposed to the
product. To facilitate our further discussion, we define the customer demand
based on their preference and purchasing behavior. Customers who prefer
a traditional channel and purchase from the traditional channel are defined
as D11 ; customers who prefer a traditional channel but purchase from a livestreaming channel are defined as D12 ; customers who prefer a live-streaming
channel but purchase from a traditional channel are defined as D21 , and customers who prefer live-streaming channel and purchase from a live-streaming
channel are defined as D22 . Overall, Figure 3.1 classified customer demands
into four categories depending on their shopping preference and purchase
channel. The total demand in the traditional channel is D11 + D21 and the
total demand in the live-streaming channel is D12 + D22 .
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Figure 3.1: Model Structure
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To characterize each demand function, we adopt a utility function of a
representative consumer introduced by Ingene and Parry (2004). This utility
function has been widely used in economy, marketing, and operations management literature (Cai 2010; Hsiao and Chen 2013; Liu et al. 2014;Wu et al.
2015; Chen et al. 2017).
In the traditional channel preference, the utility function is as follows:
2
X
X
D1i
U1 =
↵1i D1i
D11 D12
pi D1i
2
i=1,2
i=1,2
p
+ k1 (D11 + D12 ).
(3.1)
We use the first subscript 1 to denote a consumer who prefers a traditional
channel, and i to represent the purchasing channel. i = 1 is the traditional
channel and i = 2 stands for the live-streaming channel. ↵1i are initial
market sizes and D1i are realized demands in each channel, respectively.

measures channel substitution with a support of [0, 1]. When
1, the channels are purely substitutes. When
independent.
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approaches

= 0, the channels become

is the marginal increase in demand in response to a unit

investment k1 in a traditional channel.
Maximization of U1 yields the demand for each customer segment as follows.
D11 =
D12 =

↵11
↵12

↵12 + p2
1
↵11 + p1
1

p1 + (1

)k1

p

2

p2 + (1

)k1

2

p

,

(3.2)

.

(3.3)

Similarly, the utility function of consumers who prefer live-streaming
channel is given by
U2 =

X

i=1,2

+

p

↵2i (✓)D2i

2
D2i
2

k2 (D21 + D22 ),

D21 D22

X

pi D2i

i=1,2

(3.4)

where ✓ is the influence level of the live-streaming channel with a support of
[0, 1]. ↵21 (✓) is the initial market size for consumers who prefer live-streaming
channel but purchase from a traditional channel. ↵22 (✓) represents the initial
market sizes for consumers who prefer a live-streaming channel and end up
with a purchase in a live-streaming channel. We assume that ↵2i (✓) is increasing in ✓ since the higher the influence level, the larger the audience pool
and more customers are expected to be attracted to live-streaming channel.
D21 and D22 are the realized demand in two channels. The corresponding
media investment in live-streaming channel is defined as k2 .
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Maximization of the utility function yields the demand functions in each
channel of customers who prefer live-streaming channel.
D21 =
D22 =

↵21 (✓)
↵22 (✓)

↵22 (✓) + p2
1
↵21 (✓) + p1
1

p

p1 + (1

)k2

p2 + (1

)k2

2

p

2

,

(3.5)

.

(3.6)

Therefore, the total demand in traditional channel is D11 + D21 and the
total demand in live-streaming channel is D12 + D22 , where demand functions
are characterized by maximizing consumer utility functions.
Given the demand function, the total traditional channel profit ⇡1 , which
is the sum of two traditional channels’ profit, can be described by
⇡1 = (p1

c1

c)(D11 + D21 )

k12
.
2

(3.7)

Similarly, the total live-streaming channel profit ⇡2 is as follows
⇡2 = (p2

c2

c)(D12 + D22 )

k22
.
2

(3.8)

In profit functions, c is the unit production cost. c1 and c2 denote the
operation cost per item of the traditional channel and live-streaming channel, respectively. k1 and k2 are the media investment in each market. The
quadratic function explains that investing in channels generates an incremental cost.
Assumption 1. To guarantee the non-triviality of the solution, we impose
the following constraints on all cases.
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(a) ↵11 > c + c1 and ↵21 (✓) > c + c1 .
(b) ↵12 > c + c2 and ↵22 (✓) > c + c2 .
(c) 0 < 1.
The first two constraints are to guarantee the positive demand. The
constrain imposed on parameter

is derived from the second order conditions

of the profit function in the following dual-channel scenario.

3.4.

Centralized Settings

In centralized settings, the supplier makes all operational decisions and sells
products through a traditional channel, his own live-streaming channel, or
both. In this section, we first study the two special cases to create a benchmark, the single channel supply chain strategies. Then we investigate the
dual-channel supply chain structure and calculate the optimal solutions. Finally, we compare the three strategies in the presence of an influence level
✓.

3.4.1

Strategy 1 and 2: Benchmark Cases

We first consider two special cases where the supplier sells products through
a single channel, either a traditional channel or a live-streaming channel. In
strategy 1, the supplier sells products in traditional channel only, where

=0
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yields

and D12 = D21 = D22 = 0, and maximize utility with respect to D11
p
the D11 = ↵11 p1 +
k1 . The supplier determines optimal price and media
investment to maximize the expected profit.
⇡t = (p1

c1

c)D11

k12
,
2

(3.9)

In strategy 2, the supplier sells products in live-streaming channel only
( = D11 = D12 = D21 = 0) and the demand function is D22 = ↵22 (✓)
p
k2 . The objective function is as follows.
⇡l = (p2

c2

c)D22

k22
.
2

p2 +

(3.10)

The optimal solutions are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Assume 0 < 1,
(a) in strategy 1, the supplier’s optimal price and media investment, denoted
by pCt and ktC , are
↵11 + (1
pCt =
2

)(c + c1 )

,

ktC =

p

(↵11
2

c1

c)

;

(3.11)

(b) in strategy 2, the supplier’s optimal price and media investment, denoted
by pCl and klC , are
↵22 (✓) + (1
pCl =
2

)(c + c2 )

,

klC =

p

[↵22 (✓)
2

c2

c]

. (3.12)

Proposition 3.1 infers that the comparison of profits in strategy 1 and
strategy 2 is depending on the parameters and the live-streaming channel
influence level.

Lemma 3.1. There exists a threshold point

✓tlC ,
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which can be characterized

by the equation
c1 = ↵22 (✓tlC )

↵11

c2 .

If ✓ < ✓tlC , the supplier should sell the product through the traditional channel.
Otherwise, he should use the live-streaming channel.
Figure 3.2 show that the live-streaming channel price, media investment,
and expected profit increase in ✓ because of the increased market demand.
This suggests that as the increase of ✓, the live-streaming channel strategy will
outperform the traditional channel strategy. It is because the price increases
and more customers are attracted.
Figure 3.2: The Optimal Solutions of Strategy 1 and Strategy 2
(a) Price

(b) Media Investment
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Strategy 3: Dual-Channel Case

In strategy 3, the supplier sells products through a dual-channel supply chain,
the traditional channel and live-streaming channel. The supplier determines
the prices and media investment in two channels simultaneously. As we have
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discussed earlier, customers who prefer the traditional channel may purchase
in the live-streaming channel, and customers who prefer the live-streaming
channel may become a customer of a traditional channel. The supplier’s
expected profit is the sum of two channels.
max

{p1 ,p2 ,k1 ,k2 }

⇡h = ⇡1 + ⇡2

(3.13)

Proposition 3.2. Assume 0 < 1, in strategy 3, the optimal channel prices
D
D
D
pD
t|h and pl|h , and the optimal media investment kt|h and kl|h in both channels

can be expressed as:
] [↵11 + ↵21 (✓) + 2(c1 + c)] +
8(1 +
[2(1 + )
] [↵12 + ↵22 (✓) + 2(c2 + c)] +
=
8(1 +
[↵11 + ↵12 + ↵21 (✓) + ↵22 (✓) 2c1
D
= kl|h
=
4(1 +
)

pD
t|h =
pD
l|h
D
kt|h

[2(1 + )

[↵12 + ↵22 (✓)
)
[↵11 + ↵21 (✓)
)
p
2c2 4c]
.

2(2c1 + c2 + 3c)]
2(c1 + 2c2 + 3c)]

,
,

When the supplier adopts a dual-channel supply chain, Proposition 3.2
shows that the channel prices depend on the parameters. It is straightforward
to observe that the supplier will charge a higher price in traditional channel
when ↵11 + ↵21 (✓) + 2c1 > ↵12 + ↵22 (✓) + 2c2 ; otherwise, the supplier charges
a higher price in live-streaming channel. If operation costs are the same
(i.e., c1 = c2 ), the supplier will charge a higher price to the larger market
and yield a higher profit margin. If the initial market sizes are equal (i.e.,
↵11 + ↵21 (✓) = ↵12 + ↵22 (✓)), a higher operation cost leads to a higher channel
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price. The media investments are always the same because we have assumed
the demand margin in two channels are the same under the dual-channel
supply chain.
Lemma 3.2. In strategy 3, if ↵11 + ↵12 + ↵21 (✓) + ↵22 (✓)

2c1

2c2

4c > 0,

D
D
D
the optimal channel prices, pD
t|h and pl|h , and media investments, kt|h and kl|h ,

are
(a) increasing in ✓,
(b) decreasing in .

Note that the condition in Lemma 3.2 is the sum of assumptions of
demand functions to be positive. Thus, Lemma 3.2 is established on a
weaker condition than our assumptions. Lemma 3.2 demonstrates that when
a supplier launches a growing live-streaming channel (i.e., ✓ increases), price
and media investment may increase because consumers who prefer the livestreaming channel are attracted and the market size increases. On the other
side, for a given ✓, if the channel competition becomes intense after introducing the live-streaming channel (i.e.,

increases), the price and media

investment will decrease. Thus, the supplier has to evaluate the trade-o↵ between an increasing market size and a potential channel competition. Note
that we have verified that demand for every segment is non-negative for all
figures .
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3.4.3

Performance of the Centralized Strategies

In this section, we compare the three strategies and discuss the supplier’s
decision in channel selection. Due to the complicated analytical results, we
use numerical result to present our results. We use c = 0.5, c1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.1,
= 0.99,

= 0.4, ↵11 = 50, ↵12 = 10, ↵21 = 10, and ↵22 = 100, where

↵21 (✓) = ↵21 ✓ + 10 and ↵22 (✓) = ↵22 ✓ + 10, for all numerical examples. The
varying values will be specified wherever applicable.
Figure 3.3 plots the supplier’s prices, media investment, and expected
profit as a function of the live-streaming influence level ✓ to visualize the
three strategies. As shown in Figure 3.3a, when ✓ closes to 0, switching to a
dual-channel supply chain will cause the channel competition and the channel prices are lower than the price in strategy 1, the traditional channel only
option. As the increase of ✓, the prices increase because more customers are
attracted. Figure 3.3c illustrates that the supplier’s decisions depend on the
level of the live-streaming channel. The supplier should only sell the product through traditional channel if the live-streaming influence level is lower
than ✓1C . That is, when ✓ is relatively low, introducing a live-streaming channel cannot attract enough customers to compensate the losses from channel
competition and the increased media investment. When ✓1C < ✓ < ✓2C , the
increased demand and the investment reach an equilibrium and the supplier
should employ a dual-channel supply chain. If the supplier can launch the

live-streaming channel at a high influence level (i.e., ✓ >

✓2C ),
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which means the

market size will increase tremendously after introducing the live-streaming
channel, the supplier should sell product through the live-streaming channel
only.
As shown in Figure 3.3d, we include a special case where the dual-channel
supply chain dominates the single channel options when the channel substitution is low (i.e.,

= 0.2). Assuming other parameters unchanged, a lower

means less channel substitution, and the supplier can take advantage of
the increasing market size and employ a dual-channel supply chain for profit
maximization.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Solutions of Centralized Strategies
(a) Expected Profit ( = 0.4)

(b) Expected Profit ( = 0.4)
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Decentralized Case

We now begin to analyze the decentralized case, where the supplier and the
KOL maximize their profit, respectively. Instead of selling products through a
supplier’s in-house live-streaming channel, the supplier chooses to collaborate
with a KOL and sells products through the KOL’s live-streaming channel.
They agree on a revenue-sharing contract that the KOL takes a percentage
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of the total revenue in the live-streaming channel. The revenue-sharing percentage, defined as g(✓), is determined by the market and we assume it is
increasing in ✓. To investigate the supplier’s decision given a KOL’s influence
level, we formulate a two-stage problem. In stage 1, the supplier acts as the
Stackelberg leader and determines the price (p1 ) and media investment (k1 )
of the traditional channel. In stage 2, the KOL determines the price (p2 ) and
media investment (k2 ) of the live-streaming channel. To solve the two-stage
problem, we employ the standard backward induction approach. Given the
KOL’s influence level ✓, we begin with stage 2 to determine the KOL’s optimal price and media investment, and go back to stage 1 to determine the
supplier’s optimal solutions.
In stage 2, the KOL’s expected profit function can be described by
max ⇡ls = [g(✓)p2

{p2 ,k2 }

c2 ](D12 + D22 )

k22
.
2

(3.14)

In the above formulation, given the influence level ✓, g(✓)p2 is the revenue
that the KOL earns per unit in the live-streaming channel, c2 is the operation
cost, and k2 is the media investment for maintaining the channel.
In stage 1, in anticipation of the KOL’s response, the supplier determines
his optimal price and media investment in the traditional channel to maximize
his expected profit as follows.
max ⇡su = (p1

{p1 ,k1 }

c1 )(D11 + D21 ) + [1

c(D11 + D12 + D21 + D22 )

g(✓)]p2 (D12 + D22 )
k12
.
2

(3.15)

96
where p1 is the price in tradition channel; [1 g(✓)]p2 is the unit revenue from
live-streaming channel; c1 and c denote the operation cost and production
cost. k1 is the media investment made in traditional channel.
Proposition 3.3. In the decentralized case, the KOL’s optimal price and
D
media investment, defined as pD
l and kl , can be characterized by the following

equations in terms of p1 and k1 :
8
@⇡ls
>
>
= 0
<
@p2
>
@⇡
>
: ls = 0
@k2

D
The supplier’s optimal price and media investment, defined as pD
t and kt ,

can be characterized by the following equations,
8
@⇡su
>
>
>
< @p1 D D = 0
p ,k
l

>
@⇡su
>
>
: @k

l

= 0

1 pD ,k D
l
l

Due to the complicated expression of optimal solutions, we present our
outcomes through numerical results. We use the similar numerical in the centralized settings. To avoid triviality, we set ↵21 = ↵21 ✓ + 50, ↵22 = ↵22 ✓ + 20
and =0.2. In addition, because the demand functions will be infinity when
g(✓) = 0, we assume g(✓) = g ⇤ ✓ + 0.2 where g = 0.8. When ✓ = 1, g(✓) = 1,
which means the KOL take all revenues in the live-streaming channel. Figure 3.4a shows that the channel prices are depending on the parameters. It
is interesting to note that when ✓ is close to 0, g(✓) is close to 0.2, which
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means the supplier earns around 80% revenue of the live-streaming channel.
The supplier and KOL increase their media investment to attract customers.
The KOL always benefits from the increased demand of customers who prefer traditional channel but purchase from live-streaming channel. However,
if g = 0.8, as the increase of ✓, the supplier’s expected profit start to decrease. It is because the KOL takes most of the revenue in the live-streaming
channel but the revenue of customers who prefer live-streaming channel but
purchase from traditional channel cannot outpaces the negative impact of the
supplier’s media investment (Figure 3.4c). On the other hand, when g = 0.2,
which means the supplier can obtain at least 1

0.2 ⇤ 1 ⇤ 0.2 = 60% revenue

from the live-streaming channel to guarantee a growing profit. In this case,
both the supplier and KOL’s expected profit are increasing in ✓ as shown in
Figure (3.4d).
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Solutions of Decentralized Case
(a) Price (g = 0.8)

(b) Media Investment (g = 0.8)
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Supplier’s Decision

In the centralized strategies, we have discussed whether a supplier should
adopt the dual-channel supply chain compared with a single channel structure. In the decentralized case, we investigated the impact of the revenuesharing contract on the supplier and KOL’s optimal decisions. In this section,
we compare the two cases and study the impact of live-streaming channel on
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supplier’s profit.
Figure 3.5 plots the optimal price, media investment, and supplier’s expected profit in both centralized and decentralized cases given a basic numerical setting. In Figure 3.5, the channel prices and media investment in
the centralized strategies are always higher than the ones in the decentralized
case. Compared with the centralized settings, this collaboration in the decentralized case increases the price competition faced by the supplier and the
KOL. The supplier has to maintain a relatively high level media investment
to guarantee the demand in traditional channel. However, because the KOL
could benefit from the supplier’s media investment in the second stage, the
KOL has less incentive to make an investment in media to attract customers,
which results in a lower live-streaming channel media investment compared
with the centralized strategies. The KOL’s decreased media investment worsens the demand of customers who prefer live-streaming channel but purchase
from traditional channel.
In Figure 3.5c, we identify the supplier’s expected profit in centralized
and decentralized cases. For any given ✓, the supplier’s expected profit is
always higher in the centralized settings. However, in practice, the supplier’s
influence level is normally smaller than the KOL’s influence level. As shown
in Figure 3.5c, if the supplier’s self-streaming influence level is ✓1S with a
corresponding profit ⇡h (✓1S ), he should only collaborate with a KOL whose
influence level is greater than ✓2S . If the KOL’s influence level is less than ✓2S ,
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the supplier’s profit in the decentralized case is less than the profit that he
can generate in the centralized strategies, ⇡h (✓1S ). In reality, we do observe
that some suppliers su↵er from collaborating with a KOL. Although the KOL
can attract more customers than self-streaming, the supplier’s expected profit
is lower in the decentralized case due to the revenue sharing. Our findings
suggest that the supplier should carefully consider the impact of revenuesharing contract and the KOL’s influence level. Collaboration with a KOL
maybe not in the best interest of the supplier.
Figure 3.5: Comparison Results of Two Cases
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3.7.

Conclusion

Motivated by the observations of the fast-growing live-streaming commerce,
we study the impact of live-streaming channel on suppliers’ supply chain. We
consider multiple centralized settings and one decentralized case, and characterize the optimal channel prices and media investment in each strategy and
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compare the supplier’s profit to understand how the live-streaming channel
influences the supplier’s decisions.
We first show that the supplier’s decisions depend on the trade-o↵ between the potential increase in market size and the channel competition.
The supplier should insist on the traditional channel if the live-streaming
channel cannot increase the market significantly. Otherwise, the supplier
should employ a dual-channel supply chain or a single live-streaming channel to maximize his profit. Note that if the degree of channel substitution
is low, the dual-channel supply chain might dominate the single-channel options, i.e., the supplier will benefit from the live-streaming channel demand
increasing without losing many profits in the traditional channel.
Second, we analyze the revenue-sharing contract between a supplier and
a KOL and find that the supplier’s profit may decrease by collaborating
with a top KOL. Particularly, we find that a top KOL may behave as a “free
rider” if the revenue share percentage is high. It is because the supplier has to
make investment to attract consumers who prefer traditional channel, but the
KOL takes most of the revenue from customers who prefer traditional channel
but purchase from live-streaming channel. The KOL takes advantage of the
supplier’s investment in traditional channel and still keeps a large portion of
the live-streaming channel revenue.
Third, given the decreased profit margin and the revenue-sharing setting,
our findings suggest that the supplier’s expected profit may be lower by col-
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laborating with a KOL whose influence level is higher than the supplier’s,
even though the KOL could attract more customers to the live-streaming
channel.
This paper sheds light on the contract design between suppliers and KOLs.
We have considered the revenue-sharing contract between a supplier and a
KOL and revealed the trade-o↵ between channel investment and market size
expansion, which can be treated as a special case with zero slotting fee. It
would be interesting to investigate the case of a two-part tari↵, where the
KOL still retains a percentage of the live-streaming channel revenue and
charges a slotting fee to the supplier. In our paper, we fixed the slotting fee
and normalized it to 0. A possible direction for future research is to incorporate the exogenous and endogenous fixed fees to the KOL. The fixed slotting
fee depends on the KOL’s influence level. Intuitively, if the slotting fee is
exogenous, the KOL would charge a lower price in the live-streaming channel, and the corresponding live-streaming channel demand increases, which
increases the sales in the live-streaming channel. However, the regular channel demand will decrease because of channel competition. Thus, by introducing the exogenous slotting fees, the trade-o↵ is the increasing demand
in live-streaming channel and the decreasing demand in traditional channel.
Another interesting and valuable research direction is when the slotting fee
is endogenously determined by the KOL. Because the slotting fee is increasing with the KOL’s influence level, the supplier may charge a higher price
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in the traditional channel to make up for the slotting fee. The traditional
channel demand decreases and live-streaming channel demand increases due
to channel competition. In addition, the KOL would charge a lower price in
the live-streaming channel which will boost the sales even further.
Another research opportunity exists in terms of the revenue-sharing percentage. In our model, the sharing e↵ect is equally split between the supplier
and the KOL, and the percentage is determined by the market. We estimate
the impact of influence level on the price and investment only. Hence, how an
endogenized revenue-sharing percentage would change the modeling results
remains an open question and is left for future research. Finally, motivated by
the recent increase in reported incidents of livestreamers misleading promotions and fake advertising, future work can investigate the impact of customer
trust and engagement on the supply chain profit, which is highly dependent
on reputation and customer loyalty. It would be interesting to investigate
the case of multiple KOLs collaborating with the same supplier and examine
the competition among KOLs. When a supplier chooses to collaborate with
several KOLs, the same product will be o↵ered by di↵erent KOLs on the
same platform. A customer may be attracted by the price or purchase from
a trustworthy KOL by paying a premium.
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3.8.

Appendix: Technical Proofs

Proof of Proposition 3.1
We present the proof of optimal solution of Scenario 1, the Scenario 2
could be proved by using the similar approach. We replace D11 with D11 =
p
↵11 p1 +
k1 in Equation (3.9) and di↵erentiate the profit profit ⇡11 with
respect to p1 and k1 , yields the Hessian matrix
2
3
p
6 2
7
4p
5,
1
whose determinant is 2

. Given the assumption that

< 2, the Hessian

Matrix is negative definite. Thus the profit function is jointly concave in p1
and k1 . The first order derivatives are
@⇡t
p
= ↵11 + c1 + k1
2p1 ,
@p1
@⇡t p
=
(p1 c1 ) k1 .
@k1
The optimal solutions pCt and ktC are derived from solving the two first
order conditions simultaneously.

⌅

Proof of Lemma 3.1
We first replace the optimal solutions in the objective functions and sim-
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plify the equations, respectively.
(↵11 c1 c)2
=
2(2
)
[↵22 (✓) c2 c]2
⇡lC =
2(2
)
⇡tC

We obtain the threshold point ✓tlC by setting the above two equations
equal.
(↵11 c1 c)2
[↵22 (✓tlC )
=
2(2
)
2(2
c1 = ↵22 (✓tlC )

↵11

c2
)

c]2

c2
⌅

Proof of Proposition 3.2
We first substitute the demand functions, Equation (3.2),(3.3),(3.6)(3.6),into
Equation (3.7) and (3.7) to obtain the expressions of profit function, Equation (3.13). Di↵erentiating the profit function ⇡h = ⇡1 + ⇡2 with respect to
p1 , p2 , k1 and k2 yields the Hessian Matrix as follows:
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4

4

4
1+
4
1
p

2

1
4
1+
p

2

1+
p

1+
p

1+

1+

2

2

p

p

1+
p

1+
p

7
7
7
1+
1+ 7
7,
7
1 0 7
7
5
0
1

Given 0 1 and assume 0 < 1, we have
4
1+

2

< 0,

3

1<0

106
4

4
1+

2

4

2

4
1+
p

2

1+
4
1+
4
1
p

2

1

4

2

1+
p

2

1
4
1+
p

2

1+
p

1+
p

1+

1+

16
1

2

> 0,

2

2

8(2 + 2
)
< 0,
(1
)(1 + )2

=

1+

1

1+
4

2

=

p

4

4
1+
1
p

4
1+

2

1

2

1

p

p

1+
p

1+
p

1+

1+

1

=

0

0

16(1 +
)
> 0.
(1
)(1 + )2

1

It can be shown that Hessian matrix is negative definite and the profit
function is jointly concave in p1 , p2 , k1 , k2 . Solving the first order conditions
simultaneously
@⇡h
= 0,
@p1

@⇡h
= 0,
@p2

@⇡h
= 0,
@k1

@⇡h
= 0.
@k2

C
C
yields the optimal solution pCt|h , pCt|h , kt|h
and kl|h
.

⌅

Proof of Lemma 3.2
We take the first order derivative of pCt|h and pCt|h with respect to ✓ yield
@pCt|h
@✓
@pCt|h
@✓

=
=

@↵21 (✓)
@✓ [2(1

)] +
)

@↵22 (✓)
@✓

@↵22 (✓)
@✓ [2(1

)] +
)

@↵21 (✓)
@✓

+ )
8(1 +
+ )
8(1 +

,
,
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Because we assume ↵21 (✓) and ↵22 (✓) are increasing in ✓ and 0 < 1,
the first order derivatives are always positive. Thus the optimal prices are
increasing in ✓.
Next, we calculate the first order derivative of pCt|h and pCl|h with respect
to
@pCt|h
@

=

@pCl|h
@

=

[↵11 + ↵12 + ↵21 (✓) + ↵22 (✓) 2c1
8(1 +
)2

2c2

4c]

.

The first order derivatives are always negative if
↵11 + ↵12 + ↵21 (✓) + ↵22 (✓)

2c1

2c2

C
C
For kt|h
and kl|h
, ✓ only appears in numerator and

4c > 0.
exists in denomina-

C
C
tor. It is straightforward to conclude that media investment kt|h
and kl|h
are

⌅

increasing in ✓ and decreasing in .

Proof of Proposition 3.3
First, we solve the KOL’s optimal decisions of p2 and k2 .
We replace the Equation (3.3) and (3.6) into Equation (3.14) and take
derivatives with respect to p2 and k2 . We derive the Hessian matrix
2
3
p
6
4

whose determinant is

4
1+ 2
p
g(✓)
1+

g(✓)[4(1+ ) g(✓) (1
(1+ )(1 2 )

g(✓)
1+

1

)]

7
5,

. Because 0g(✓)1, 0 < 1, and

0  1, these assumptions guarantee that 4(1 + )

g(✓) (1

) > 0 and
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the Hessian matrix is negative definite. Therefore, the KOL’s expected profit
is jointly concave in p2 and k2 .
The two first order derivatives are
@⇡ls
1
=
@p2
1
@⇡ls
=
@k2

p

{g(✓) [↵12 + ↵22

2

+ 2 p1
[g(✓)p2
1+

c2 ]

(↵11 + ↵21 ) +

p

(k1 + k2 )(1

)

4p2 ] + 2c2 } ,

k2 .

D
The optimal solutions pD
l and kl are derived from solving the two first

order conditions simultaneously.
pD
=
l

klD =

g(✓) [4
p

1
{[2
g(✓) + (4 + g(✓) )]

g(✓) + (2 + g(✓) )] c2

p
+g(✓)(1 + ) [↵12 + ↵22
(↵11 + ↵21 ) + 2p1 +
(1
⇥
⇤
p
g(✓) ↵12 + ↵22
(↵11 + ↵21 ) + 2p1 +
(1
)k1
4 g(✓) + [4 + g(✓) ]

)k1 ]} ,
2c2

.

D
Second, we substitute pD
l and kl into Equation (3.15) and take derivatives

with respect to p1 and k1 . The second order derivatives are as follows.
@ 2 ⇡su
=
@p21
(1

4
)[4
[4
2

g(✓) + (4 + g(✓)

g(✓) ]2 + [2g 2 (✓)
[g 2 (✓)

2

2

+ g(✓)(4 + 6 )

)]2

2 3 [6

4g(✓)

g(✓)(2

)]

16]

12] ,

p
2 [8 + 2 [8 g(✓)(4
)] + [16 g(✓)(4
)] 2g(✓) ]
@ 2 ⇡su
=
,
@p1 @k1
[4 g(✓) + (4 + g(✓) )]2
@ 2 ⇡su
1
=
16 4[1 + g(✓)] + g 2 (✓) 2
2
2
@k1
[4 g(✓) + (4 + g(✓) )]
+ [32

2g 2 (✓) 2 ] +

2

[16 + 4[1 + g(✓)] + g 2 (✓) 2 ] .
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The determinant of the Hessian matrix is
4{16 4[2+g(✓)] +g 2 (✓)

We first prove

2

+

3

2
@⇡su
@p21

[

2g(✓)( 2)+ ]+ [16+4g(✓) 2g 2 (✓)
(1 )[4 g(✓) + [4+g(✓) )]2

2

]+

2

[2g(✓)(2+ )+g 2 (✓)

2

+7

12]}

.

< 0. Because the denominator is positive, we need to

prove the numerator is always negative. Note that

is the channel substitu-

tion e↵ect and g(✓) is the percentage of revenue-sharing. They both have a
support of [0, 1]. Besides, we have assumed that 0 
region, the maximum of the numerator is

< 1. In the feasible

32 when g(✓) = 0,

= 1 and

= 0.314. Therefore, the numerator is always negative and the denominator
is positive. We proved

2
@⇡su
@p21

< 0.

Similarly, we can prove that

2
@⇡su
@k12

is negative. The denominator is positive

and we need to prove the numerator is always negative. The maximum of
the numerator is

9 when g(✓) = 1,

= 0 and

= 1.

For the determinant of the Hessian Matrix, the denominator is positive
and the minimum of the numerator is 32 when g(✓) = 1,

= 1 and

= 0.15.

Thus, we have proved that the Hessian Matrix is negative semidefinite
and the supplier’s expected profit function is jointly concave in p1 and k1 in
the feasible region.
We then solve the first order conditions for the optimal price pD
t and media
investment ktD in the traditional channel, and substitutes the expressions of
D
D
D
pD
t and kt into the result of pl and kl to obtain the optimal solutions in the

live-streaming channel.

⌅
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